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This volume, a review of selected literature relevant to developing 
countermeasures against certain unsafe driving act ions ( U D  As), was 
prepared under National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
contract number DOT-HS-7-01797, entitled t'Identification of General 
Deterrence Countermeasures for Unsafe Driving Actions." The review is 
one of three volumes reporting work conducted under this contract. The 
other reports are presented in TTVolume I: Description and Analysis of 
Promising Countermeasurestt and TfVolume 111: A Definitional Study of 
Speeding, Following Too Closely, and Driving Left of Center.tf The 
project was conducted by the staff of the Policy Analysis Division of The 
University of Michigan Highway Safety Research Institute. 
This review deals only with literature in two broad subject matter 
areas, decision-m aking and social control. The reasons for this limitation 
are discussed later in this section. 
Three UDAs were originally of concern in this project. They are: 
Speeding, 
Following too closely, and 
Driving left of center. 
A definitional study (see Volume 111) conducted jointly as a part of this 
project  and two o ther  NHTSA-sponsored projects  ( con t rac t  nos. 
DOT-HS-8-01827 and DOT-HS-8-02023) found that the first UDA (Speeding) 
was the most appropriate target for the type of countermeasures of 
interest in this project. Subsequent countermeasure development effort 
was directed a t  the speeding U D A  and specifically a t  conscious and 
intentional commissions of this UDA. 
OBJECTIVES 
The general objective of the literature review was to identify and 
discuss literature on decision-making and social control relevant to the 
management of traffic crash risk created by the speeding UDA. Specific 
objectives were to: 
describe major theories and explanations that are useful in 
understanding the nature of risk and decisions that are 
made in managing risk, 
describe the basic concepts, principles, and mechanisms 
that relate to controlling driver behavior, and 
determine the implications of this material for developing 
and successfully operating countermeasures to reduce the 
incidence of the speeding UDA. 
SCOPE A N D  APPROACH 
This volume is a focused examination of those aspects of the 
behavioral sciences that appear to be the most directly related to the 
goals of this study. It is not intended as a comprehensive compendium of 
law, sociology, and psychology, nor is i t  a review of specific highway 
safety countermeasures. 
The subject matter for this review is a logical consequence of the 
conceptual framework that was used in designing the  project .  A 
description of this framework is provided in Volume I of this report. Its 
essential elements are: 
the definition of an unsafe driving action as an act  or 
omission by a driver that increases the risk of a traffic 
crash above a level that is societally tolerable, 
the identification of target UDAs for this project as those 
that are conscious and intentional, 
the precept that such target UDAs occur as the result of 
a rational decision-making process by the driver, 
the existence of social-control processes that attempt to 
influence driver decision-making about UDAs. 
Thus, two major concerns in designing countermeasures to reduce the 
incidence of target UDAs are: 
how drivers make decisions about UDAs, and 
how these decisions can be influenced to produce a 
preferred outcome for society. 
There is a body of literature that deals with each of these two areas. 
The l i t e ra tu re  on decision-making has its roots in the behavioral 
sciences and in mathematics. Its domain is the factors that influence 
human behavior and the way they interact in a given environment to 
produce a decision. The literature on social control flows primarily 
from law, sociology, psychology, and related disciplines (e.g., criminology). 
It is concerned with the nature and effects of control forces that are 
exerted on an individual by others with whom that individual interacts. 
Clearly, both of these bodies of literature go far beyond the realm of 
highway safety. An exhaustive survey of all of this literature would be 
neither possible nor desirable for this project. Instead, there is a need to 
identify major theories, concepts, and principles to help stimulate the 
creation of countermeasure concepts based on a firm scientific foundation. 
This is the context within which this review was conducted. 
This review was a part of a larger review conducted in concert with 
the police enforcement project. It supported the police enforcement 
project by providing a perspective on those aspects of social control 
involving the concept of deterrence that is missing in most of the 
literature on traffic law enforcement. The theore t ica l  groundwork 
provided by this review also helped both projects in identifying highway 
safety applications of relevant principles and i n  assessing specif ic  
countermeasures  and procedures gleaned from the highway safety 
literature. A full report of the part of the review tha t  addressed 
specific procedures used by the police in enforcing related traffic laws 
was published as a separate volume under the police enforcement project 
(see Jones et al. 1980). 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME 
This review is presented in three parts. First, literature relating to 
decision-making is discussed in Chapter Two. Included in this section is a 
discussion of classical and modern decision theory and of psychological 
and sociological factors that influence the application of the theory. 
In Chapter Three, basic concepts of social control are discussed. The 
various levels of social control are defined, and related psychological and 
sociological theories are described. The mechanism of social control 
called deterrence or legal deterrence is also discussed in Chapter Three. 




The preceding chapter noted the critical role that decision-making 
plays in the highway safety process. The decisions individuals make with 
respect to risk determine the magnitude of the risk of traffic crashes and 
influence societal actions to reduce the crash risk to acceptable levels. 
To develop countermeasures to reduce traffic crash risk, it is necessary 
to understand how these decisions are made by individual system users, 
policymakers, risk managers, and society as a whole. 
This chapter briefly reviews decision-making theory. It presents major 
theories and explanations that are useful in understanding traffic crash 
risk and the management of that risk. 
DECIDING TO COMMIT A UDA 
What is involved when a driver decides to commit a UDA?  Joscelyn 
and Jones (1977) provide a departure point for answering the question. 
Their review describes how existing theories of human decision processes 
can be applied in managing traffic crash risk. A description of decision 
processes can be abstracted from the decision-making theories they 
discuss. Basically, all theories state that the decision-maker goes through 
six stages: (1) outlining alternative actions; (2) dividing the world into a 
set of possible future states, called outcomes; (3 )  assessing the value or 
u t i l i ty  of each outcome; (4) estimating probabilities, conditional upon 
each alternative action, of each outcome (i.e., for each alternative action, 
how likely i t  is that each possible future state will become the true state 
if that action is taken); (5) integrating the probability and u t i l i ty  
information using one of a number of alternative schemes; and ( 6 )  
comparing the integrated information with a criterion, which leads to a 
decision. The six hypothetical stages describe human decision-making, 
A variety of theories and models ex tant  i n  the social  science 
literature seek to explain the planned or conscious behavior of individuals 
and groups. Such theories attempt to describe and predict such behavior. 
Perhaps the best known of the theories of conscious behavior is found in 
the empirical and theoretical literature in the area known as decision 
theory. 
Decision theory has its origins in the branch of mathematics known as 
probability theory. Questions posed in a decision-theory context  
stimulated advances in the mathematics of probability theory. So closely 
are these two fields allied that one can regard decision theory as a 
branch of applied probability theory. 
Expected Value Theory 
The f i r s t  theory of decision-making was based on the concept of 
expected values. The theory originated to facilitate better decisions 
about gambling. It s ta tes ,  in effect,  that a gambler faced with a 
decision about how to make bets on uncertain events with d i f ferent  
payoffs should bet on the event that, on the average, maximizes his 
winnings. The expected value model may be formally specif ied as  
follows: a decision-maker must select one course of action out of a set 
of alternatives. Through some independent random process, a "state of 
the worldv1 is determined or selected from a set of all possible states. 
The selection by the decision-maker of an alternative, followed by the 
occurrence ,  by random process, of a particular s tate  of the world 
determines an lvoutcome,vf which can be represented as a monetary payoff 
(or loss) t o  the  decision-maker. Fur ther ,  i t  is assumed that the 
decision-maker knows the probabilities with which each of the possible 
s tates  of the world can occur; the monetary values associated with each 
possible outcome; and the sets of possible courses of action and possible 
s tates  of the world. The expected-value model of decision-maker will 
make a choice by computing the ''expected value1' or average return of 
each a l t e rna t ive  avai lable ,  and then select that alternative whose 
expected value is largest. This maximizing of expected value is referred 
to in decision theory as a strategy. 
This model of "rationalvv decision-making, developed within the context 
of gambl ing  choices ,  was soon proposed as a theory of human 
decision-making, Under the prevailing belief that humans were essentially 
guided by reason and rationality, the normat ive  (objective) expected 
value decision model was proposed, and for a time was accepted by some, 
as a descriptive model of human decision-making. Using this model, a 
dec i s ion  problem is constructed when a l l  a l t e rna t ive  act ions and 
outcomes are described in  a relational structure. Decision trees (see, 
e.g., Raiffa 1969) represent decision problems. Figure 2-1 is an example 
of a decision t r e e  for the decision problems described below, The 
asterisk represents the whole decision problem; boxes represent actions; 
circles represent outcomes. The links represent relational paths between 
actions and outcomes. 
The following is an example of the construction and solution of a 
decision problem: A man begins a 350-mile return trip to his home. He 
travels on the interstate highway system. An expected-value decision 
theory indicates he would go through six stages in choosing what speed to 
maintain with his cruise control: 
a )  Outlining the alternative actions, he remembers the late 
1960s and early 1970s when the speed limit was higher. He 
also remembers the speed limit is now 55. So, he develops 
two alternative actions, A , and A : 
A1: Cruise at  55 A2: Cruise at 70 
b) He imagines four possible future states (4 -04 ) establishing 
outcomes: 
01: Be home without incident in 5 hours; 
0 2 :  Be home without incident in 6 hours, 20 minutes; 
03 : Be cited for speeding; or 
0 4 :  Have an accident because of the chosen cruising 
speed. 
c )  He next assigns utilities to each of the outcomes. Dollar 
values will be used here. The following matrix describes his 

utility assignment. 
Outcome: 01 0 2  03  04 
Utility: $600 $450 $40  0 $-10,000 
d) He  e s t i m a t e s  t h e  probabilities of the  outcomes, conditional 
upon each alternative action. Table 2-1 represents t h e  dr iver ' s  
probability assessments: 
TABLE 2-1 
PROBABILITY ASSESSMENTS FOR EXAMPLE DECISION PROBLEM 
OUTCOME 
01 0 2  0 3  0 4  
(Arrive in (Arrive in (Citation) (Traffic 
5 hours) 6 hours, Crash) 
20 minutes) 
Action: 
A1 (55 mph) 0.0 ,99999 0.0 .00001 
A2 (70 mph) ,99998 0.0 .00001 .00001 
e )  T h e  d r i v e r  u s e s  m a t r i x  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  t o  i n t e g r a t e  
p robab i l i ty  a n d  u t i l i t y  i n f o r m a t i o n .  H e  m u l t i p l i e s  t h e  
p robab i l i t i e s  and  u t i l i t i e s  and  t h e n  adds  the products t o  get  
the  expected va lue  ( s e e  Edwards  1954) f o r  e a c h  a l t e r n a t i v e  
c o u r s e  of ac t ion.  For Al (cruise a t  55) the  expected value is 
$449.90; for A2 (cruise a t  70) the  expected value is $599.89. 
f )  The  dr iver ' s  c r i t e r i o n  is  t o  s e l e c t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  action 
with the  maximum utility. He then se t s  the  cruise  c o n t r o l  a t  
70 and drives on. He decides t o  commit the  speeding UDA. 
The above described example is, of course, g r e a t l y  overs impl i f i ed .  A 
350-mile t r ip  consists of many decisions regarding speed, and these 
decisions depend on many o the r  f ac to r s ,  such as  the  presence of 
enforcem'ent symbols, CB radio messages, road and weather conditions, 
and the speed of other traffic. Nevertheless, this example does illustrate 
the expected-value decision-making model. 
As with other models and theories of human behavior, i t  was not long 
before experimental investigations indicated that human decision-makers 
did not in fact comply with the predictions of behavior generated by the 
expected value model. For example, instances could be constructed in 
which most persons would prefer certain choices with lower expected 
value over those with higher expected value. Thus, it was evident that 
human decision-makers were responding to  aspects and dimensions of 
decision-making situations that went beyond the mere computation of 
probabilities and monetary payoffs, 
Utility Theory 
Upon the failure of expected value theory to adequately describe the 
decision-making behavior of actual decision-makers, t he  theory was 
modified by introduction of the concept of uutility.v Without going into 
the technical and mathematical properties of utility theory it is sufficient 
here to define i t  as an index of an individual's personal or subjective 
preference for an outcome, object, or event, By replacing the objectively 
defined concept  of "valueff (measured in monetary units) with the 
subjectively defined concept of it was hoped that the rationality 
assumption of human decision-making could be retained by the simple 
expedient of proposing that individuals are guided in their de cision-m aking 
by those choices that maximize expected uti l i ty  rather than expected 
value. 
Though expected utility theory fared better than expected value in 
explaining and predicting the choice behavior of human subjects, 
the  revised model was not able to adequately explain the anonalous 
experimental results that continued to be produced. For example, certain 
choice situations could be constructed in which subjects consistently 
preferred an alternative that provided lesser expected utility. Again, the 
da ta  indicated tha t  the dimensions of decision-making were more 
numerous and complex than those of the explanatory model. 
Scient i f ic  controversy now centers  around whether humans are 
yyrationalfl or "irrationalyy in making decisions. The "irrationalT? label has 
often been applied to decision-making that does not follow the expected 
value or expected u t i l i ty  theory, Simon (1957) has resolved the  
controversy with his theory of "bounded rationality.'' Because of humans' 
cognitive limitations, Simon indicates that humans must deal with the 
world through simplified Mmodels.?y He argues: 
. . . (the decision-maker) behaves rationally with respect to 
this (simplified) model, and such behavior is not even 
approximately optimal with respect to the real world (or to 
prescriptive decision processes). To predict his behavior, we 
must understand the way in which this simplified model is 
constructed, and its construction will certainly be related to 
his psychological properties as a perceiving, thinking, and 
learning animal. (p 198) 
Thus we assume that drivers make decisions that are rational with 
respect to a bounded, internal world-model. 
Recent reviews of decision-making (e,g., Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein 1977) indicate the utility assessment s t age  most likely 
involves the most conscious mental activity. Private decision-makers 
show great concern about their own welfare. They focus much attention 
on identifying what outcomes produce a ??payoffw in their world-model and 
tend to disregard other factors, such as the actions they must take to 
obtain the outcome, or the probabilities of the outcome. 
Private world-models determine what payoffs will be assigned to  
o u t c o m e s  ( s e e ,  e.g., Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1977). 
World-models include perceptions, personal values, and attitudes, which are 
discussed below. In assessing the utility and disutility of outcomes, the 
private decision-maker follows a course consistent with the values, 
desires, and needs dictated by his or her world-model. In our earlier 
example the driver valued time a t  home a t  $120 per hour. Assuming 
outcome 01 affords the driver five hours a t  home, it is worth $600 to 
him; outcome 02 that provides only 3 2 / 3  hours a t  home, is worth 
roughly $450. Other drivers would value time at home differently, but 
still according to their world-models. 
Two questions now arise: (1) What utilities and disutilities do drivers 
assign to driving outcomes? and 2) How accurate do the assignments seem 
with respect to the "free market?ll 
No information exists about driver disutility assignments. We do not 
know what value drivers place on disutility producers such as sanctions, 
collisions,  injuries, or fatalities. Devoid of data, we are left  with 
speculation. 
In general ,  i t  has been substantiated that drivers assign a large 
positive utility to fulfilling personal transportation needs through driving 
the i r  own car  (Finkelstein and McGuire 1971). Furthermore, the 
psychometric analysis of Fischhoff et al. (1976) shows that people perceive 
large societal benefits stemming from their use of motor vehicles. Clear 
evidence exists that drivers perceive a large utility from the safe use of 
their motor vehicles; however, no data exist that pertain to specific 
outcomes. For our example driver, no hard data exist about assigning 
payoffs to outcomes. Though we can infer from the general level data 
that most drivers assign large utilities to outcomes involving safe travel, 
the da ta  a r e  not specif ic  enough to lend great confidence to such 
inferences. A thorough analysis of driver decision-making requires the 
development of distributional norms for the utilities (and disutilities) 
assigned to  spec i f ic  outcomes. The current  lack of such norms 
constitutes a significant knowledge gap. 
In the face of this gap, we can only speculate about the  values 
assigned to driving outcomes and their accuracy. With respect to decision 
problems about whether to drive unsafely, Edwards (1968) suggested that 
drivers overestimate the utility of unsafe driving, are not even concerned 
with the utility of safe driving, and underestimate the disut i l i ty  of  
accident involvement, From this viewpoint, UDAs result because of both 
the drivers1 overestimation of their utility and underestimation of their 
potential disutility. 
A point related to Edwardsf assessment is that risk may be perceived 
as a utility itself. Certain drivers may find a large positive utility from 
t r ea t ing  driving as a "gamble." They prefer the thrill of accepting 
accident risk to the humdrum of driving safely (see, e.g., Andriessen 
1972). The thrill of "flirting with deathft is very valuable, and likely 
provides some drivers with a strong motivation to commit a UDA. 
Overall, sufficient data do not exist to rigorously describe how utility 
and disutility values are assigned to driving outcomes. This lack of data 
prevents us from determining (a) how accurate drivers are a t  utility 
assignments, and (b) whether drivers' utility/disutility assignments lead 
them to commit UDAs, as Edwards suggests. These questions cannot be 
answered at this time. 
St i l l ,  values and payoffs probably dominate a driver's conscious 
reasoning when deciding whether to commit a UDA.  This suggests that 
private utility assessment is an area at which a risk-management strategy 
should be directed. We will now review what might be done to change 
driverst utility assessments. 
Subjective Probability 
The next step in refining the rational theory of decision-making was to 
propose that the objectively defined probabilities of previous models be 
replaced by what might be called Itsubjective probabilitie~.~' In a 
subjective-probability model, individuals, in their decision-making, deal in 
probabilities in a personal  way, judging likelihoods in  ways that well 
might differ from some objectively defined standard. People could be 
expected to make their decisions upon the basis of their own personal and 
subjective feelings about probabilities, rather than upon some externally 
defined measure of likelihood. Further, this modification in decision 
theory allowed for individual variation in choice behav io r  and 
decision-making. It was therefore possible, under subjective-probability 
theory, for two decision-makers with identical preferences for outcomes 
to be both ttrationaln and arrive at different decisions simply because they 
differed in their appraisal of the probabilities of various outcomes. This 
concept of subjective probability originated long before decision theory 
was defined as a separate discipline, but was not incorporated into 
decision theory until fairly recently. 
Ideally, a review of driver probability estimation would answer two 
questions: (1) how drivers make the estimates (i,e., what reasoning 
processes do they employ), and (2) how well drivers estimate the risk and 
probabilities (i.e., whether their estimates reflect the actual likelihoods). 
The currently favored theories of probability and risk estimation claim 
that heuristics are used. A heuristic is a plan or approach for solving a 
problem. It provides guidance, but does not guarantee that a solution will 
be reached, or, if reached, that the solution will be accurate. Heuristics 
are best thought of as parts of people's world-models. They allow people 
to use their limited cognitive capacities to deal with very complex, 
real-world situations by reducing the amount of "mental effortn required 
to make judgments. To make judgments easier, many heuristics lead the 
decision-maker to ignore hard-to-obtain, but critical, real-world data and 
substitute nondiagnostic private world-model surrogates that are easily 
brought to mind. Because critical information is ignored, heuristics lead 
decision-makers to perform more or less "irrationallyft with respect to  
objective probability data. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1971) identified heuristics that can play a large 
role in probability and risk estimation. One heuristic is pertinent here. 
Drivers employ the availability heuristic when they judge the probability 
or risk of an event by the ease with which instances of the event can be 
brought to mind, Consequently, when estimating traffic-crash risk, people 
are greatly influenced by the relative ease with which they can remember 
traffic crashes. The availability heuristic therefore involves the conscious 
process of bringing instances of events (e.g., accidents) to mind, but not a 
conscious attempt to judge how likely the event will occur. Drivers who 
use the availability heuris t ic  do not consciously think about the  
probabilit ies and the risks of outcomes; instead, they think only about 
the outcomes themselves, devoid of probability and risk. 
Fischhoff et  al. (1976) used the availability heuristic to explain the 
results they obtained when people estimated the risk of death in a motor 
vehicle crash. People tend to overestimate this risk in comparison to the 
risk of death from other causes, for example, from disease. This makes 
sense in light of the availability heuristic, as traffic accidents are given 
intense and often spectacular media coverage. Media pictures are very 
salient in a driver's mind, so drivers easily remember them when 
estimating traffic crash risk. 
Joscelyn and Jones (1972) surveyed drivers of Fairfax County, Virginia. 
One question allowed drivers to estimate their risk of apprehension for 
violating traffic laws. Over one-half of all respondents estimated the risk 
as greater than .22.  Since the actual risk of apprehension is far less 
than this, most drivers grossly overestimated the risk. One reason for 
this could be the availability heuristic: traffic stops are easily pictured 
i n  the driver's mind and are therefore perceived as more likely than they 
really are. Other reasons can be identified with learning theory, and 
these are discussed below. 
No specific data exist about how and how well drivers estimate the 
probabilities of not having a crash or not receiving a citation. The 
partial information available in the literature suggests that drivers will 
tend to overestimate the risk of a disutility-producing outcome (either an 
accident or a citation) because they vividly remember (or can imagine) 
both accidents and citations and employ the avai labi l i ty  heuris t ic .  
Overestimation will occur regardless of the presence or absence of a 
UDA, By a similar argument, drivers will tend to underest imate the 
probabili ty tha t  no incident will occur; drivers will have difficulty 
remembering or imagining the no-incident situation because such situations 
have relat ively less salience in a person's memory. However, this 
conjecture is a hypothesis requiring experimental verification. Another 
hypothesis might be that the repeated occurrence of no-incident trips is 
reinforcing, resulting in an overestimation of the probability of no 
incident (This is treated in greater detail in the discussion of learning 
processes in the next subsection). 
The l i t e ra tu re  on the accuracy of private probability estimation 
repeatedly points to one conclusion: people are poor a t  estimating risk 
and probability (see, e.g., Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1977). A 
number of reasons have been proposed. People do not u n d e r s t a n d  
p r o b a b i l i t y  because i t  is a complex concept (Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein 1977, 1976). Because people do not understand probabilistic 
relationships and processes, they use erroneous heuristics in probability 
estimation (Kahneman and Tversky 1977; Kaplan and Newman 1966). The 
avai labi l i ty  heuris t ic  implies that dr ivers  do not focus upon t h e  
probability and risk of outcomes,  but instead focus on the outcomes 
per  se. More generally, people do not use all  t h e  information they 
have when judging uncertainty (Edwards 1968). 
In their limited world-models, people do not consciously deal with 
probabilities and risks; instead they deal with outcomes. Even with 
sophisticated statist ical  training, scientists make inaccurate probability 
estimates, and do not employ appropriate statist ical  procedures (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1971). Thus, attempting to change driver behavior by 
changing risk estimation is likely to fail. 
Not only are humans unskilled a t  handling probabilistic concepts, but 
the difficulty of dealing with risk per se  is compounded by the fact that 
the traffic-crash risk is very small,. In any individual's life, a traffic 
crash is a rare event. People make more errors in estimating extreme 
probabilities (those near zero or one-Phillips and Edwards [1966] ); indeed, 
the distinction between one in N events and one in 10 or 100 times N 
events becomes obscure and remote when N reaches the millions and 
billions. In general, decision-makers deal poorly with very small risks. 
So, even if drivers were easily to grasp the concept of risk, traffic-crash 
risk would produce difficulty because on any given trip it is so small. 
Prevention of accidents is an example of what psychologists call a 
vigilance task. A vigilance task attempts to prevent low probability but 
highly costly outcomes from occurring. A serious injury in a traffic crash 
is an example of such an outcome. In general, people are very poor a t  
performing vigilance tasks due to suboptimal resource allocation, In plain 
terms, people tend either to be overly concerned with the large possible 
loss and expend more effort and resources than are warranted on accident 
prevention; or take the att i tude that lli't won't happen to  mef1 and 
completely ignore the possibility of an accident, meaning no caution is 
exercised. Slovicfs (1978) data and analyses also support this viewpoint. 
If not given any guidance, most people will be very suboptimal in 
allocating resources for accident prevention. Thus, risk managers must 
include specific directions about how caution should be exercised i n  
driving, so that people act optimally to prevent accidents. 
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN DECISION-MAKING 
What has,evolved is essentially a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y  of 
decision-making, r a the r  than a truly "rational" theory. With the 
abandonment of the index of monetary value to appraise the worth of 
alternatives, and the replacement of objectively defined probabilities with 
personal or subjective ones, the burden of understanding and predicting 
the decision-making behavior of individuals and groups has shifted from 
mathematicians and decision theorists to social and behavioral scientists. 
That ac tua l  human decision-makers do not conform to neat rational 
models of decision-making has become obvious. To understand how 
decisions are made, attention must now be directed to the social and 
psychological factors that affect human decision-makers. 
Along with the  realization that formal and urationalll. models of 
decision-making a r e  inadequate as descr ipt ive theories  of ac tua l  
decision-making, i t  has begun to be accepted that social factors also play 
an important role in the behavior of decision-makers. The individual is 
part of a social and institutional structure that tends to shape perceptions 
and values in systematic ways. Thus, to understand and predict the  
decision-making process, one must also study the social milieu in which it 
takes place. An adequate theory of decision-making, unlike theories of 
the past, must consider the influences of societal factors upon individual 
and group decision-makers. 
Learning Processes and Decision-Making 
Knowledge of human behavior gleaned from other  a reas  of the  
behavioral sciences can be of great help in understanding the underlying 
psychological and societal factors that affect human decision processes. 
One area deserving further study is the manner in which fundamental 
principles of the human learning process interact with personal bias and 
place constraints upon decision-making. Although it appears obvious that 
a decision-maker is also a lllearner," there is little in  the empirical or 
experimental literature that deals with changes in behavior during the 
decision-making process. 
Traditional models of decision-making typically conceptualize the world 
as made up of statistically independent events, and hence have relied 
upon mathematics that assumes them to be independent. Behavioral 
scientists, however, recognize t h a t  the re  is a marked s t a t i s t i c a l  
dependency in real-world events that is often mirrored in the laws 
describing human behavior. Unlike ideal decision-makers, human 
decision-makers are affected in their perception of the present by 
experiencing the consequences of their past decisions. In some 
s i tua t ions  this may be appropriate, as when the fisherman who was 
successful at a particular bend in the river in the past returns there in 
the expectation of again being successful. In other situations, however, 
this  very f 'humanu c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  works t o  t h e  d e t r i m e n t  of 
decision-makers, as when the gambler, having experienced a string of 
losses a t  roulette, makes larger wagers, falsely reasoning t h a t  the  
probability of a win must have been increased by the past losses, To 
adequately understand the dynamics of decision-making, the  na tur  a1 
propensities of humans to perceive the world in a particular manner and 
the plasticity of behavior subject to past events or f'reinforcersff must be 
incorporated in theoretical formulations. 
While we know very little about how humans cons t ruc t  decision 
problems, per se, we do know some things about how humans construct 
the relational structures for general problems. Recent research a t  
Carnegie-Mellon University (Simon 1975), and The University of Michigan 
(Greeno 1972) indicates that an individual's "decision t r e e "  r e f l e c t s  
primarily (a) what the decision-maker remembers from setting up previous 
and similar decision problems; and (b) what the decision-maker perceives 
from the immediate decision situation. 
What a driver remembers and perceives controls the establishment of 
alternative driving acts and outcomes. A decision-maker's world-model 
affects perception and memory processes, The ffrationality" of a driver's 
decision is determined in part by the match between the construction of 
the decision problem by the driver and the  construct ion t h a t  risk 
managers think should be employed. Since world-models are idiosyncratic, 
great individual differences exist in the decision problems constructed by 
individuals. What appears to be an irrational and unsafe driving behavior 
to the risk manager may actually be based on alternatives that the driver 
considers sound and wise, 
Since memory and perception are private processes, they lead one 
driver, or one group of drivers, to construct radically different decision 
problems from other drivers or groups. The differences can be very 
significant. For example, Klein (1972) has pointed out that some teen-age 
youth often regard a vehicle more as a bar or motel than as a means of 
transportation, Therefore, the driving decision problems they formulate 
are radically different, for example, from those of people in their fifties. 
These teen-agers do not think of transportation factors; instead, they 
construct decision problems about recreation factors. 
Recency and Time Delay 
Another important aspect of human behavior that plays a part in the 
decision-making process relates to the dimension of recency. 
The recency phenomenon, well established through experimental studies, 
plays an important role in the learning process. According to  some 
learning theorists, learning takes place when the consequences of various 
behavioral acts provide 'lfeedbackff to the individual in the form of 
rewards and punishments. Behaviors that produce consequences rewarding 
to the individual have an increased probability of a future occurrence, 
while behaviors that produce punishing consequences have a lessened 
probability of future occurrence. Through this "reinforcingv mechanism 
the  consequences of various behaviors serve to strengthen certain 
behaviors while eliminating others, 
Put simply, the recency effect means that the amount of learning 
produced by a reward or punishment will depend upon the time delay 
between the behavior that produced it and its consequences to the actor. 
Thus, when there is a long delay between behavior and consequent 
rewards and punishments, the consequences do little to alter behavior; 
when the delays are minimal, rewards and punishments have their greatest 
impact upon learning. Graphically, the relationship between time delay 
and amount of learning resembles that shown in Figure 2-2. 
This fundamental principle of human learning has profound effects upon 
how persons make decisions. It follows from this principle, for example, 
that individuals will' tend to underestimate and thus undervalue the impact 
of fu ture  events ,  and correspondingly overvalue the  immediate  
consequences of the i r  behaviors. This very human sort of bias is 
reflected in such sayings as "A bird in the hand is worth two in the 
bush," or "Let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we shall die." 
FIGURE 2 - 2  
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In some instances of decision-making, this sort of bias may not be 
harmful; to a certain degree it may be justified, in the economist's words, 
to the future. However, there are a number of situations in  
which this aspect  of human nature  leads decision-makers to seek 
immediate gains at the expense of objectively more desirable long-range 
gains. In other words, the recency effect may lead a decision-maker, in 
evaluating alternatives, to overestimate the value of immediate rewards 
and underestimate the value of delayed rewards. The same is true with 
respect to punishments; the immediate ones are overvalued, the delayed 
ones undervalued. For example, the immedia te  d i s c o m f o r t  o r  
inconvenience of wearing a seat belt may lead some people not to use 
them, but increases the probability that they will suffer much more 
severe consequences (such as death or serious injury) in the future. Only 
after a crash has occurred, and the injury is an immediate event rather 
than a remote one, does one regret not wearing a seat belt. 
Bias in decision-making caused by the recency phenomenon can have 
especially deleterious effects when a particular behavior produces a 
mixture of consequences, such as an immediate small reward and a 
delayed but severe punishment. In this instance the time-delay effect 
may well lead the decision-maker to ignore the future punishment in his 
preference for immediate gain or reward. For example, a decision to 
drive after drinking too much alcohol produces an immediate reward i n  
the form of readily available transportation, but increases the risk of a 
future crash or arrest and its accompanying llpunishment.ll 
Perception of Risk and Probability 
In the preceding discussion of the time-delay effect,  attention was 
directed toward a cognitive process that, in decision-making language, 
affects one's subjective evaluation of outcomes. There it was stated that 
the decision-making models used to describe choice behavior are composed 
of two classes of variables: those dealing with outcomes and their 
evaluation by the decision-maker, and those involved with the appraisal of 
probabilities, likelihoods, and risk. Behavioral science can contribute a 
great deal to our understanding of both classes of variables. 
As stated earlier, human beings are not very skilled a t  estimating 
probability, and their difficulty with this concept is exacerbated by the 
relative rarity of traffic crashes or citations. This would be so even if 
human beings functioned independently and entirely apart from others, 
which of course is not the case. In the probability or risk-appraisal 
dimension of the decision-making process, one deals primarily with a 
perceptual and cognitive aspect of behavior. In this aspect of human 
behavior, there is a complex interaction among physiological, social, and 
environmental factors. It is almost a truism to say, from a perce~tual 
standpoint, that flobjectivev reality exists only as an idealized state. 
For example, studies conducted in  the social psychological laboratorv 
have shown that an individual's perception of so simple an event as the 
movement of a light source in a darkened room is greatly affected by 
prior reports of movement made by other persons who were also there 
(Sherif 1936). Similarly, the observer's motivational states and preexisting 
attitudes and beliefs can greatly affect the perception of a situation; for 
example, hungry persons tend to  see  food items in the ambiguous 
perceptual field of a Rorschach card. Everyone is also familiar with the 
phenomenon captured in  the folk wisdom of the proverb, "The grass is 
always greener on the other side of the fence," or Aesop's fable of the 
"sour grapes," In each of these examples the individual's perception of 
particular events or states of the world is affected by the probability of 
achieving a sought-after outcome. (The proverb and the fable constitute 
competing fltheoriesll of behavior; the former predicts that unattainable 
outcomes are enhanced in attractiveness, while the latter predicts that 
humans deal with their setbacks by minimizing them.) 
Several other behavioral phenomena that can bias humansf appraisal of 
llrealityll have been discovered in the psychological laboratory but have 
not yet been integrated into theories of decison-making. For example, it 
has been established that individuals, when shown a random sequence of 
binary events (such as a string of red and blue lights), almost invariably 
report detecting a "pattern." That is, people automatically attempt to 
find and impose an orderly rule or explanation for observed phenomena or 
an event even when, in a statistical sense, such order is absent. A 
converse e f fec t  has also been observed. Subjects in  a psychological 
experiment have been asked to attempt to generate a random sequence of 
events--for example, to simulate the behavior of a fair coin and state the 
outcomes of 100 hypothetical flips of the coin. However, when these 
humanly generated flrandom" events were analyzed by statistical tests of 
r andomness ,  t h e y  a r e  a l m o s t  i n v a r i a b l y  found t o  be h ighlv  
nonrandom--that is, very different from what would be generated by a 
truly random device. These two aspects of the human response t o  
randomness have significant implications for the study and modeling of 
human risk behavior. What they imply is that humans deal quite poorly 
with random events because they do not recognize randomness when 
they see it, and what they do perceive as random is generally in fact not 
random. These aspects of the human perceptual process cannot but 
influence the decision-making process by introducing systematic bias and, 
as a result, less than optimal performance. 
Another very human foible that affects individual decision-makers when 
they deal with probabilities is their susceptibility to selective distortions 
of memory when evaluating their own prior performances. This has been 
demonstrated in studies in which subjects are asked to give estimates of 
the probability that particular future events will occur. Some weeks or 
months later, the subjects are brought back and some are informed that 
those particular events had in fact occurred, while others were told the 
same events had not. Each group of subjects is then asked to recall 
their previous probability estimations. Subjects who were told the events 
h a d  occurred "recalled1f larger probability estimations than they had 
actually made; those who were told the events  had not occurred 
" r e ~ a l l e d ' ~  smaller es t imations than they had actually made. This 
"hindsightf7 effect is not surprising to observers of human behavior. 
Persons a r e  prone to  recal l  the  past  i n  ways tha t  enhance their 
self-esteem. Thus, when one relies upon the past to provide information 
and lessons as the base for present or future decisions, the "hindsight" 
effect can bias his or her estimations, causing the decision-making to be 
less than optimal. 
Most individuals have this "hindsight" bias partly because humans 
generally misunderstand and misapply the concept of probability. 
Although most persons have an 11intuitive77 theory of probability, in many 
cases their intuitions vary so much from objective theory tha t  the  
performance of untrained individuals in probability estimation tasks falls 
far below optimal levels, For example, when humans were asked to  
estimate the probability of alternative hypotheses, based upon samples of 
data that pertain to those hypotheses, the subjects were less able to 
make o p t i m a l  use of t h a t  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  da ta  than s t a t i s t i ca l  
decision-making models were able to do. In such situations, ~ e o p l e  
generally tend to be uconservativeff; that is, they change their estimates 
of probabilities a t  a slower rate than is called for by the available 
evidence. Put another way, human decision-makers, a t  least untrained 
ones, do not make f u l l  use of all the information available to them in 
estimating probabilities. 
Individual Attitudes and Values 
Psychological theory states that attitudes and values are included in 
everyone's world-model. Furthermore, attitudes and values determine how 
and what payoffs will be assigned to outcomes, Attitude and value 
theory indicate that there are a t  least two sources of influence fo r  
shaping a driver's utililty assessments. The first source of influence is 
social norms. Wilde (1976) and Shor (1964) have analyzed the effect of 
social norms on driver decision-making; their analyses indicate a great 
effect exists. Social norms are discussed in g rea te r  de ta i l  in the  
social-control materials in Chapter Three. Internalized attitudes and 
values comprise the second source of influence on the driver's decisions. 
Att i tudes and values a r e  important components of every individual 
world-model. In considering how drivers might be dissuaded from 
committing UDAs through changing their attitudes and values, several 
possible approaches are available. All of these approaches assume a 
model of driver behavior similar to the one illustrated in Figure 2-3, The 
left box in that figure represents the Highway Transportation System 
(HTS) without drivers. The HTS provides a driver, represented by the 
right box, with input. Other HTS components include vehicles, highways, 
and elements that support their operation (e.g., fuel supplires, vehicle 
manufacturers, and highway construction firms). The driver's world-model, 
through remembered attitudes, values, and skills, controls his or her 
perception and response to  HTS input. Attitudes and values play an 
integral role in those functions. Driver behavior is the response to HTS 
input and that response in turn serves as input to the HTS. 
Figure 2-3 illustrates that driver decision-making can be changed 
either by rearranging the input that is received by the driver, or by 
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changing how the driver processes input. In the former case, drivers' 
world models are not tampered with; instead, ex terna l  payoffs a r e  
changed so that the existing attitudes and values of the driver lead to 
the desired behavior. Scientists refer to the approach of rearranging 
input as the "external incentives" approach. Several types of external 
incentives are used to influence behavior. Economic incent ives  often 
induce people to behave appropriately, and social approval incentives 
also motivate a great number of. behaviors. 
People often pattern or model their behavior after others whom they 
admire. In the case of modeling, attempts are made to a l t e r  input 
processing by changing drivers' world-models. Since attitudes and values 
are often the focus of these change efforts, the approach of rearranging 
w orld-models is ref erred to as the "attitude changef' approach. That 
approach uses a number of means to change attitudes, Some means have 
been formalized into a technology called "persuasive communications." 
Persuasive communications covers a broad variety of methods, and applies 
to many traffic safety problems. 
Driver Impairment and Decision-Making 
Factors more transient than social norms or attitudes and values also 
influence driver decision-making, An individual's physical and mental 
s ta te  can affect behavior and factors that alter these states can enhance 
or impair driving performance. Among these factors are  disease and 
other conditions (such as fatigue, anxiety, depression, and epilepsy) as well 
as chemical agents such as alcohol and other drugs. For example,  
psychoactive drugs (including alcohol) interact with brain functions and 
thus can heavily influence the decision-making process of drivers. Such 
chemicals can af fec t  an individual's ability both to receive information 
and to process it. For example, alcohol has been shown to degrade 
almost everyone's visual acuity at the higher blood alcohol concentrations 
(Newman and Fletcher 1941). A person's abi l i ty  t o  concen t ra t e  on 
driving-related tasks also is impaired by alcohol (see, for example, 
Moskowitz [I9741 1. 
The literature is replete with examples of the impairing affects of 
alcohol on more complex functions of the nervous system such as are 
involved in decision-making. Some research suggests that many individuals 
are  more likely to engage in risk-taking after drinking (Cutter, Green, and 
Harford 1973; Goodwin, Powell, and Stein 1973; Wallgren and Barry 1970). 
However, the mechanisms responsible for this behavior are not well 
understood. For example, it is not known whether impaired abilitv to 
perceive risk or impaired ability to process risk information is more 
responsible for increased r i sk - t ak ing  a t  h igher  blood a l c o h o l  
concentrations. Certainly, alcohol does adversely affect both short-term 
and long-term memory (Ehrensing et  al. 1970; Wallgren and Barry 1970) 
and would thus be expected to alter a driver's assessment of drivine; 
outcomes by degrading the information available for making decisions. 
Among substances that can impair driving ability, alcohol is both 
unique and much studied. Alcohol-its actions and ef fects--is often used 
as  a re ference  point in considering the potential of other drugs to  
increase highway safety risk, Yet drugs other than general cen t ra l  
nervous system depressants (of which alcohol is one) differ greatly in 
their actions on the brain and in their effects on behavior. Agents that 
primarily influence mood, such as tranquilizers and antidepressants, or 
sensory perception, such as hallucinogens, are well known but l i t t l e  
studied in relation to driver decision-making. Marijuana, which may be 
said to have both depressant and s t imulant  propert ies ,  appears t o  
influence cognitive functions such as perception and information 
processing. Some research has indicated that subjects given doses of 
marijuana are less inclined to engage in risk-taking behavior (Rafaelson et 
al. 1973; Dott 1972). Whether this results from a shift in decision-making 
criteria, an enhanced perception of risk, or reflects compensation for a 
self-perceived impairment due to the drug cannot be determined from 
existing data. What is eviedent is that different drugs can influence 
decision-making behavior differently. 
Thus, i t  is clear that the decision models described in the preceding 
sections of this chapter do not apply uniformly to impaired drivers. Such 
drivers may be expected to differ from other drivers both i n  their 
selection and use of decision-making models. 
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UNCONSCIOUS DECISION-MAKING 
Another issue in driver decision-making is whether the commission of a 
U D A  is conscious or unconscious. Consciously committing a U D A  
involves a reasoned and deliberate intent to drive in a risky manner, for 
example, speeding to arrive a t  onels destination in a shor te r  t ime.  
Unconsciously committing a U D A  implies the lack of a reasoned and 
deliberate intent to drive in that manner, for example, speeding because a 
driver selects a speed according to the flow of traffic and consequently 
does not realize how fast he or she is driving. 
The conscious/unconscious distinction theoretically would divide UDAs 
into two categories. Although characterizing a driving ac t  as llconsciousfl 
or " U ~ C O ~ S C ~ O U S ~ ~  is not relevant for the purposes of defining and 
measuring UDAs, this  theore t i ca l  dis t inct ion provides important  
information for examining driver decisions to commit UDAs. Drivers 
engage in fundamentally different thought processes for conscious UDAs 
than for unconscious UDAs. Consciously committing a UDA implies the 
driver follows a series of decision steps, weighs factors, and decides. 
Unconsciously committing a U D A  implies the driver does not follow the 
decision steps, but instead acts  through well-established and automatic 
habit. Some habitual driver behaviors may be amenable to external 
manipulation using some of the social-control approaches described in the 
next section. 
Whether a U D A  is conscious or unconscious makes a difference in 
what countermeasures can be developed to reduce its incidence. If  
drivers consciously commit a UDA, countermeasures should aim at altering 
drivers1 decision processes so that they are  less likely to commit them. 
If drivers unconsciously commit a UDA,  countermeasures must not only 
both bring the commission of that act under conscious control, but must 
also,  if necessary, a1 t e r  t he  drivers1 conscious decision processes. 
Changing decision processes requires  an extensive and complex  
risk-management strategy, which probably requires a great expense of 
time and money. Thus, decision-making analysis must not onlv recognize 
the distinction between consciously and unconsciously committing a UDA, 
but also must identify the  most economical countermeasure design 
features necessary to reduce the incidence of UDAs. Note, however, that 
the  focus of this study is on conscious UDAs resulting from driver 
decisions; consequently,  these mater ials  will discuss consc ious  
decision-making in detail. 
As s t a t ed  ear l ie r ,  a driver who outlines al ternat ive outcomes 
establ ishes a decision problem in his or he r  mind.  When t h e  
decision-maker does not describe alternative outcomes, then meaningful 
utility assignment and probability estimation are impossible. In the latter 
case the driver does not consider the real-world information existing at 
the time of driving but instead acts from an internalized "script." For 
example, a person who drives fast because he imitates the way Burt 
Reynolds drives in the movies is such a script follower. 
Drivers who act from internalized scripts will likely not respond to the 
same types of countermeasures that would be effective for those who 
integrate real-world information. Acting from a script requires little 
thought and conscious activity. Script followers "blindlyu act  them out 
and  i g n o r e  r ea l -wor ld  information tha t  is found important  b y  
decision-makers who integrate information. Like well-established habits, 
scripts alone determine behavior. Very l i t t le in the immediate driving 
environment can therefore effectively change a script-f ollowerls behavior. 
Thus, countermeasures directed a t  script-followers must change the 
internalized script itself to effectively change behavior. 
OTHER DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
The fully rational decision-making model, and the  unconscious 
decision-making process, in a sense represent the opposite poles of driver 
decision-making. Between these extremes are a number of processes in  
which the  decision-maker considers some elements of the problem 
presented, but rejects other, equally important elements. 
A decision-maker's world-model limits the information-integration 
scheme that is used. Limitations come from both forward and backward 
directions in the decision process. Decision-making stages that occur 
prior to the information integration stage impose forward limitations. 
For example, if a decision-maker's world-model does not include a working 
concept of probability, then no probability or risk information will be 
available for integration. The final decision (criterion-comparison) stage 
imposes backward limitations. For example, if a decision-maker 's  
world-model prescribes choosing only outcomes that can lead to the 
largest utility (regardless of their risks and probabilities), choice requires 
only utility information. 
Alternative inf ormation-integration schemes have been investigated in 
psychological experiments (see, Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein [I9771 
for a review). These alternatives fall into four categories, which are 
s u m m a r i z e d  i n  T a b l e  2 - 2 .  C o m b i n a t i o n - a n a l y s i s  
information-integrat ion schemes  are similar to the decision-making 
example that appeared earlier in this Chapter. These filter out neither 
p r o b a b i l i t y  n o r  u t i l i t y  i n f o r m a t i o n .  A s p e c t - a n a l y s i s  
information-integration schemes filter out probability information and 
a m p l i f y  u t i l i t y  i n f o r m a t i o n .  P r o b a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  
information-integration schemes  amplify probability information and 
f i l ter  out utility information. Script information-integration schemes 
ignore both probability and utility information. 
In plain terms, the combination-analysis decision-maker pays attention 
to both utilities and probabilities; the aspect-analysis decision-maker pays 
c l o s e  a t  t e n t  ion t o  u t i l i t i e s  and  i g n o r e s  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ;  t h e  
probability-analysis decision-maker ignores u t i l i t i e s  and pays close 
attention to probabilities and risks; and the script decision-maker pays no 
attention to the utilities and probabilities involved and merely acts  from 
a memorized script. 
Thus, a driver who selects a driving speed that would maximize 
expected value uses a combination information-integration scheme. A 
driver who speeds because time spent at  home is valued more highly than 
time spent on the road uses an aspect-analysis information-integration 
scheme. The driver who speeds for thrills uses a probability analysis 
information-integration scheme to  maximize expected value. Finally, a 
d r i v e r  who m i m i c s  B u r t  R e y n o l d s t  d r i v i n g  uses  a s c r i p t  
information-integration scheme. 
TABLE 2-2 
ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION-INTEGRATION SCHEMES 
CATEGORY OF INFORMATION 
INTEGRATION SCHEME DESCRIPTION 
Aspect Analysis In aspect-analysis schemes, probability and 
r i s k  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  i g n o r e d  o r  
deemphas ized .  D e c i s i o n s  a r e  b a s e d  
p r imar i ly  on t h e  sub j ec t i ve  ut i l i ty  of 
outcomes. The informat ion-int e g r a t  ion 
scheme issued to  order outcomes by their 
associated utility. 
Probability Analysis In p robab i l i ty  analys is  schemes, utility 
information is ignored or deemphasized.  
Dec i s i ons  a r e  based p r imar i ly  on t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of  o u t c o m e s .  T h e  
information-integration scheme is used to 
order outcomes by t h e i r  p robab i l i ty  of 
occurrence. 
Combination (Aspect and In combination-analysis s chemes ,  both  
Probability) Analysis probabil ity and  ut i l i ty  information a r e  
considered, and underpin decision.  The 
information-integration scheme is used to 
order outcomes with a bivariate function 
of their probability/risk. 
Script In script schemes, all information from the 
w o r l d  i s  d e e m p h a s i z e d .  T h e  
decision-maker follows a coherent scr ip t  
t h a t  ( s ) h e  h a s  m e m o r i z e d .  T h e  
decision-maker tlblindly" plays a role much 
like a movie actor follows a script. 
SUMMARY 
The theory of human decision processes has evolved to a point where 
the underlying social and psychological factors in decision-making are of 
cen t ra l  concern. At first, simplistic notions about what constituted 
"rationall' behavior dominated the field, leading to models that, while 
appealing, did not reflect the actual behavior of most decision-makers, 
These early theories dealt with what were believed to be the two major 
ingredients in decision-making: the probabilities of various events 
associated with a decision alternative, and the values associated with the 
occurrences of those events. It was found that real decision-makers often 
do not, as theory predicted they should, combine these two ingredients so 
that their decision is made on the basis of maximum expected value 
across all alternatives. 
Substitution of subjective probabilities for actual probabilities and 
utilities for objectively determined values resulted in more realistic 
theories but shifted the emphasis from the mathematical to the social 
sciences. At present, the major concern in the study of human decision 
processes is how to determine subjective probabilities and utilities rather 
than how to manipulate them. 
The time-delay (recency) effect and biases related to perception and 
cognitive processes illustrate some shortcomings of contemporary decision 
theory. They point out a possible synthesis of behavioral theories of 
learning on the one hand and decision theory on the other. Most early 
theories of decision-making disregarded certain important psychological 
and social dimensions of human behavior that play a crucial function in 
the decision-m aking process-for example, persons' tendency to fldiscount'f 
t h e  f u t u r e  when choos ing  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o u r s e s  of a c t i o n .  
Behavioral-learning theories, for their part, typically fail to take account 
of the planning and goalseeking behavior of humans engaged in such tasks 
as information processing and problem solving. 
Thus, a theoretical approach to decision-making that uses behavioral 
s c i e n c e  knowledge as well as  the  theore t ica l  power of formal  
mathematical models might well increase the feasibility of affecting 
persons' decision-making processes. Certainly, taking account of certain 
human  limitation^^^ that make people less than ideal decision-makers may 
make it possible to formulate decision-makinq aids that would improve 
their ability to make good decisions, or assist them in avoiding some of 
their poorer decisions. Also, many individuals solve problems by ignoring 
utilities, ignoring probabilities, or following internalized scripts ( in  ef feet 
ignoring both utilities and probabilities). That these persons use defective 
decision-making models must  be c o n s i d e r e d  when deve lop ing  
countermeasures to unsafe driving behavior. 
With respect to risk perception, the literature on human behavior 
identifies several factors relevant to highway safety. For example, in 
perceiving probability or risk, people tend to: 
make insufficient use of available information, 
be influenced by preexisting attitudes or beliefs, 
have selective distortions of memory when evaluating their 
own performance, 
be influenced by others in a group, and 
have difficulty in understanding concepts of randomness 
and probability. 
All of these factors represent points at which society might intervene to 
improve driver decision-making, When these difficulties exist, drivers 
suffer from a perception gap between perceived risk and actual risk. 
Efforts to narrow the gap would clearly be enhanced by taking cognizance 
of what a lready is known in the  field of decision theory and the 
behavioral sciences. Further reduction of the perception gap will become 
possible when contributions of mathematical modelers and statisticians are 
combined with those of behavioral scientists to form an integrated theory 




T h e  p u r p o s e  of t h i s  s t u d y  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  h u m a n - o r i e n t e d  
countermeasures by which the incidence of conscious UDAs and t h e  
consequent crash risk can be reduced. Because all UDAs are the product 
of some human behavior, and because behavior can be shaped or changed, 
i t  is important that  the means by which individual behavior is developed, 
changed, and maintained be examined. In addition, the decision-making; 
l i tera ture  pointed out that  many human decisions are influenced strongly 
by the values, attitudes, and beliefs that  an individual holds. People's 
values, at t i tudes,  and beliefs a r e  also determined by the social-control 
forces surrounding them. 
The materials contained in this section are presented to acquaint the 
reader with the  basic concepts of social control that  re la te  t o  driver 
behavior. Not all of the concepts presented here are equally applicable 
to the development of risk management strategies and countermeasures; 
for example, it would be more difficult to  deal with driver behaviors 
stemming from early childhood experiences than those that  a r e  learned 
through association with other drivers. Nonetheless, it is important to 
learn in a general sense what means of intervention a re  suggested by the  
socialscience literature and how intervention might o~e ra t e .  
LEVELS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
The term llsocial controlll includes a variety of control forces that are 
exerted on the individual by those around him or her. These forces differ 
widely with respect to  the control agent, the content of the control, and 
the way in which control is exerted. One way of classifying control 
forces is by the level of control. Social behavior theorists discuss social 
control on three principal levels: the primary, secondary ,  and t e r t i a r y  
levels. Their main distinsuishing characteristic is the person or persons 
who are the agents of control. 
Two other terms are  important to  a basic understanding of social 
control: socialization and internalization. Socialization is t he  
process by which a person's behavior is brought into conformity with the 
values of the culture to which (s)he belongs. One such value of interest 
to this discussion is the avoidance of conduct that poses an unreasonable 
risk of harm to others, Socialization focuses upon "the whole process by 
which an individual develops through transaction with other people, his 
specific patterns of socially relevant behavior and experience" (Zigler and 
Child 196 9). The social-control techniques discussed here are regarded as 
the most important factors in the socialization process. 
Internalization is a critical concept in the area of social control. It 
refers to the process of transferring social control from an external agent 
(such as a police officer) to the internal control mechanisms of the 
individual. Research in the area of crime and traffic has indicated that 
lack of internalization reduces behavioral compliance with the law. 
Research by Joscelyn, Bryan, and Goldenbaum (1971) as well as Brackett 
and Edwards (1977) suggests that for some drivers, lack of internalized 
control results in noncompliance with the posted speed limit. These 
investigators note that only when a control symbol (i.e., a police officer) 
is present will those drivers comply. Once the  ex te rna l  symbol is 
removed, drivers may resume their violation of the speed limit in the 
absence of internal controls. Internalization, therefore, is a desired 
out corn e of the social-con trol techniques discussed here, because through 
internalization, the incidence of risky behaviors can be reduced without 
complete reliance on external controls. 
The social control that can produce socialization and internalization 
has been divided in the sociological literature into three distinct levels. 
Each level contains its own identifiable agent of control, a specific set  of 
behaviors to be controlled, and a particular process by which the control 
mechanisms operate. Each is discussed in sequence. 
Primary Level 
The primary level of social control develops at  the individual level and 
occurs primarily during the socialization experiences of early childhood. 
This is the level a t  which basic notions of proper and improper behavior 
are learned. The child's compliance with the primary socialization process 
is induced by a system of rewards and punishments that are administered 
by the child's immedia te  env i ronment  (p r imar i ly  p a r e n t s  or  t h e i r  
surrogates). The behavior of the child determines whether rewards or 
punishments are forthcoming. The terms tlrewardtl and f'punishmentw a r e  
used in t h e  psychological  l i t e ra tu re  while the corresponding terms 
"positivefl and "nega t ive t t  sanct ions  a r e  more  commonly used by 
sociologists. Through reward and punishment, therefore, the child learns 
to distinguish between proper and improper ,  and be tween  soc ia l ly  
acceptable and socially unacceptable behaviors. 
In addition to learning socially proper behaviors a t  the primary level 
of socialization, a child learns to respond to authority. It is this function 
that allows for the continuing development of social prohibitions in the  
individual. By legitimizing authority, the early socialization experience 
sets up the conditions necessary for the internalization of prohibitions 
throughout life. The outcome of a successful socialization experience, 
from society's viewpoint, is the internalization of the proper and improper 
behaviors as well as the concept of the legitimacy of authority. 
One point deserves mention here. The term "authorityn could refer  t o  
any of a number of persons or institutions in society. Some of these 
persons or institutions, such as the leader of a delinquent gang, might not 
be t h e  s a m e  ones t h a t  a re  recognized as legitimate by the rest of 
society. Therefore, the socialization process might not always follow the 
socially acceptable direction. Children could learn behaviors that are 
correct  for their social position but improper for the larger society. 
Subcultures can and do generate se ts  of behaviors that  a re  in direct 
conflict with the larger society: Miller (1958), for example, identified a 
number of at t i tudinal  sets (e.g., "toughtf) among delinquent youths. Being 
socialized in a subculture where the outside (socially dominant) authority 
is not legitimized can lead to later rejections of the dominant authoritv 
sources. These conflicts between subculture and dominant culture rules 
and norms may account for differences in behavior not only on moral 
issues but on issues of traffic law compliance and related behavior. 
Although the case of subcultures and delinquency is an extreme one, the 
fact  remains that society is heterogeneous and that groups within society 
differ in their definitions of proscribed behaviors. 
Secondary Level 
The secondary level of social control occurs within an individual's 
social environment. This environment consists of school and play groups 
for the child and work and recreational groups for the adult. These 
groups are informal, and are selected by the individual, An individual's 
select ion of groups, however, is not independent of his or her prior 
socialization experience. It can be inferred that those with s t rong 
internalized controls will select other high-control groups and vice versa, 
In either case, secondary control is produced by interaction with other 
people within a social group. 
To maintain predictable behavior in its members, the group uses a 
system of rewards and punishments. Rewards (positive sanctions) include 
acceptance, survival, friendship, employment, and emotional support; 
punishments (negative sanctions) include ostracism, hatred, and emotional 
withdrawal. 
I t  is not clear to what extent secondary control forces affect an 
individual's driving behavior. Although it is conceivable that som e persons 
will habitually associate with antisocial drivers (for example, a group of 
youths who regularly hold drag races on public highways), it cannot be 
said with assurance that incompetent drivers, or highway risk-takers in 
general, will gravitate to poor driving groups. 
Tertiary Level 
The tertiary level of control is external to the individual and to the 
individual's social groups; it is the control exer ted  by the  socially 
powerful. This control is implemented through a larger social or political 
organization, For example, to deter crime, society has created a criminal 
jus t i ce  sys tem tha t  ac t s  through the police, courts, and corrections 
authorities, and is supported, for example, by driver-licensing authorities, 
mental hospitals, and public health departments. The traffic law system, 
a subsystem of the criminal justice system, is society's formal mechanism 
for dealing with drivers who take socially unacceptable risks (Joscelyn and 
Jones 1972), and is perhaps the best known tertiary control mechanism for  
reducing the traffic crash risk. 
In all cases, the agents of the tertiary level are formal organizations 
com missioned through legitimate channels of government and designated to  
control behavior. Their control takes two forms: d i rect  control and 
symbolic control, which are known as s p e c i a l  d e t e r r e n c e  and g e n e r a l  
d e t e r r e n c e ,  respectively. (These a re  discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter.) Social control agents on the ter t iary  level--as in t h e  
p r imary  and secondary levels--maintain proper behaviors through the 
administration of positive sanctions (rewards) and negative sanc t ions 
(punishments). 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
Because risk management  in e f f e c t  means  t h e  management  of 
individual and group behavior, i t  is essential that  i t  rest on identified 
formal theories and principles. Two major disciplines t h a t  concern  
themse lves  with human behavior ,  psychology and sociology,  have 
developed relevant theories and principles. 
Psychology is, in its simplest terms, the scientific study of behavior, 
the focus of which is the individual. Sociology is also the s tudy of 
behavior ,  but  with re fe rence  to the groups to  which the individual 
belongs. This section presents two general areas of psychological theory 
t h a t  a r e  r e l evan t  t o  d r ive r  behavior:  l e a r n i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  and 
developmental pr inciples .  Sociological theories a re  discussed in the 
next section. 
Learning Theories 
Learning principles a r e  concerned with the role that experience plavs 
in the modification of any behavior, including driving behavior. It is 
postulated that three basic learning processes underlie socialization: 
c lass ica l  conditioning, operant  condi t ioning ,  and o b s e r v a t i o n a l  
learning. Each approach has implications for bringing about change in 
driving behaviors. 
Classical  Conditioning. Classical conditioning is particularly useful 
for exploring and explaining the acquisition of emotional responses in 
humans. John Watson (Watson and Raynor 1920) was one of the first to 
demonstrate these implications. He directed an experiment conditioning: a 
fear response in a child. The child, who was eleven months old, was not 
afraid of a white rabbit but did cry a t  t he  sound of a loud noise. 
Watson systematically presented the child with a white rabbit (known as a 
c o n d i t i o n e d  s t i m u l u s ) ,  t h e n  m a d e  a loud n o i s e  (known a s  a 
unconditioned stimulus). After several pairings of the rabbit and noise, 
the child cried when he saw the rabbit even when the noise was not 
presented. The child's crying is known as a conditioned response. 
Later, the child's response general ized to furry things. Interestingly, 
when a conditioned stimulus (in this case, the rabbit) was repeatedly 
presented without being followed by the unconditioned stimulus (in this 
case, the noise), its power to bring about a conditioned response gradually 
diminished and eventually disappeared (extinction). Researchers have, 
since Watson's time, classically conditioned a wide range of behaviors in 
people of all ages. 
Applying classical conditioning principles to bring about emotional 
responses to  unsafe driving acts is relatively s t ra ight forward .  For 
example, a televised picture of an unsafe driving act (such as speeding) 
could be quickly followed b y  one of a gory, bloody crash scene.  
Repeated pairings and viewings by the audience should lead to their 
acquiring the emotional response to speeding alone and their subsequent 
avoidance of that behavior. According to classical conditioning principles, 
however, pairing of speeding and the crash scene would have t o  be 
repeated periodically to prevent extinction of the conditioned emotional 
response to speeding. It should be noted, however, that such conditioning 
of emotional responses is more relevant to the young than to an adult 
population. 
Operant Conditioning. The second learning process is operant 
conditioning. It differs from classical conditioning in that the individual 
actively participates in this learning process rather than remaining passive 
as is the case in classical conditioning. The outcome is therefore  
contingent upon the person's behavior. Accordingly, operant conditioning 
draws heavily upon the mechanisms of reward and punishment. Within 
this learning process, reward is termed positive reinforcement; it refers 
to the presentation of a pleasant stimulus (a reward) after a particular 
response or behavior has occurred. Awarding motorists a reimbursement 
check a t  the end of a I1good drivingf1 year is an example of positive 
reinforcement; as an additional incentive, this reward could be increased 
for each subsequent year of good driving. The goal of the posit ive 
reinforcement mechanism is to increase a particular behavior--in this 
case, good driving. Punishment is termed an aversive stimulus that is 
presented following a particular behavior. The goal of punishment is the 
reduction of a certain response, For example, when a motorist receives a 
c i ta t ion  ( the  aversive stimulus) for exceeding the speed limit (the 
behavior), punishment should lead to an eventual decrease in speeding.. 
In a d d i t i o n  to  the reinforcement  mechanisms of reward and 
punishment, two mechanisms used by agents  of social  control a r e  
negative reinforcement and omission training. Negative reinforcement 
refers to the removal of an aversive stimulus a f t e r  a par t icular  
response. Its aim is similar to that of positive reinforcement-to increase 
desired behavior. The buzzing in an automobile as a reminder to fasten 
the seat belt is an example of negative reinforcement. The behavioral 
goal of the buzzing sound is to increase seat belt use. To terminate the 
buzzing sound (remove the aversive stimulus), the motorist must buckle 
the seat belt (the desired response). 
Omission training, like punishment, has the reduction of a particular 
behavior as its goal. It refers to the removal of a positive stimulus 
af ter  a certain response. The removal of driving privileqes (the positive 
stimulus) after committing a hazardous driving a c t  ( the  behavior) 
illustrates omission training. 
Like classically conditioned behavior, operantly conditioned behavior 
can be extinguished by withdrawing reinforcers. How readily extinction 
takes place depends upon the conditions and schedules of reinforcement 
under which the particular behavior was learned. To use a t r a f f i c  
example: Drivers in Group A are stopped by a police officer each time 
they commit a UDA (a continuous reinforcement schedule). Drivers in 
Group B are stopped, on the average, once for every five UDAs (a partial 
reinforcement schedule). Operant learning theory predicts that when the 
enforcement symbol (here, the police officer) is withdrawn or absent, 
drivers in Group A will resume their unsafe driving habits sooner than 
will the drivers in Group B. Under continuous reinforcement schedules, 
every desired response is reinforced; thus, behaviors learned under these 
schedules are extinguished fairly rapidly. Under partial reinforcement 
schedules, however, responses are reinforced only occasionally; thus, these 
behaviors are more resistant to extinction than behaviors that have been 
continuously reinforced. 
One f i n a l  issue regarding the  operant  learning concerns the  
effectiveness of punishment, There has been debate over the usefulness 
of punishment as a socializing tool. Investigations of its effectiveness in 
inhibiting socially unacceptable behavior indicate ambiguous results a t  
bes t ,  This is also t rue  in the area of driving behavior. Research 
suggests that the manner in which punishment is administered influences 
its effectiveness in inhibiting unacceptable behavior. These aspects are 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Modeling. The third learning process is that of observational learning 
or modeling. Basically, modeling refers to the learning of a behavior by 
observing other persons. Designing and developing; countermeasures based 
upon the observational learning approach is fair ly  s t raightforward:  
Appropriate models are chosen and their safe driving behaviors made 
known to an audience, either through direct daily observation of others or 
vicariously through common media such as television, radio, newspapers, 
magazines, and motion pictures. Careful consideration must be given in  
choosing driving models for a particular population or audience. Research 
indicates that the characteristics of a model can influence how much an 
observer imitates the model's behavior: High-status models are more 
likely to elicit imitation than are low-status models; same-sex models are 
more apt to be imitated by the observer than are different-sex models. 
Thus, in an activity- or athletic-minded community, a sports celebrity 
could be used as a model of safe driving actions; a highly regarded 
representative of the  t ruckers  could be used as a model for the  
truck-driving community. By observing such models, individuals can learn 
safe driving behaviors that they can reproduce later. 
It is apparent that the focus of the learning theorist's approach to 
driving behavior is to understand observed responses in  the presence of 
cer ta in  stimuli .  To change a particular driving behavior, stimulus 
conditions must be manipulated. 
Developmental Theories 
A second psychological approach to the study of the socialization of 
socially acceptable behaviors emphasizes development a1 stages of growth. 
Developmental concepts of growth and maturation in copition provide an 
alternative approach to using reward and punishment or sanctions in the 
design and development of UDA countermeasures. Developmental theories 
stress the stable and predictable changes in human development that 
influence an individual's receptivity to socialization pressures; thev focus 
upon interaction of maturation and experiences. The developmental 
framework that is probably most useful to the highway practioner is that 
of Piaget (1956). 
Piagetts formulations of cognitive development, when applied to the 
area of traffic safety, suggest countermeasures based upon drivers1 
experiences. In Piagetls scheme, experience plays a key role in the 
socialization process. Socialization, in this framework, is a continuous 
adaptation to one's experiences and activities. Adapatation, however, is 
limited by the person's level of maturation. Piaget viewed maturation as 
a natural progression through qualitatively different stages of growth; 
therefore,  the  kind of learning tha t  can occur a t  each level is 
qualitatively different from the learning that was possible during the 
preceding stages. When individuals mature to a new level, they reach a 
more sophisticated level of conceptualization and perceive the world from 
a qualitatively different framework. Thus, in Piagetts framework, a 
constant exchange occurs between individualst levels of maturation and 
their environmental experiences. 
Piaget maintained that moral development proceeds through three 
stages: (1) objec t ive  moral i ty ,  or blind obedience, in which moral 
c o n c e p t s  a r e  based  upon w h a t  i s  permi t ted  or forbidden; ( 2 )  
interpretation-of-the-rules,  in which the person shifts from moral 
realism to moral relativism, distinguishes between the spirit and the letter 
of the law, and makes subjective moral judgments that lead to more 
c o n s i s t e n t  a d h e r e n c e  t o  t h e  r u l e s  in  p r a c t i c e ;  a n d  ( 3 )  
interpretat ion-of- the-act ,  in which the person develops a sense of 
ethical and moral responsibility. Experience is an important factor in the 
development of the second stage, while the abi l i ty  t o  reason is an 
important component to the third stage. 
The application of P iage t t s  notions t o  driver behavior lead t o  
countermeasures based on driver experience. Beginning drivers have little 
highway experience; their driving decisions are likely to be based on rules 
and laws. For these drivers, explaining the merits of traffic regulations 
is unlikely to have much meaning in the absence of experience. With 
increasing experience, however, a driver is better able to interpret and 
understand traffic regulations and can relate explanations of those rules 
to personal situations. That being the case, a driver education program 
could proceed in several phases and not end when a driver's license is 
obtained. The first phase should focus on teaching driving regulations and 
facts. A second training phase could occur after an individual has been 
driving for some specified length of time and has developed personal 
driving experience. This latter phase could then focus more effectively 
on explanations of t r a f f i c  regulations and facts; in so doing, this 
instruction would be setting up the conditions under which a person can 
interpret traffic rules, thereby leading to a more consistent adherence to 
them. 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
Sociology attempts to explain behavior in terms of the groups t o  which 
an individual belongs. Because society is heterogeneous, individuals belong 
to  a wide variety of groups. For that  reason, no single sociological 
strategy could possibly affect the behavior of all drivers. 
The areas of sociological theory that  a re  most relevant to  dr iver  
behavior a re  those that  relate to crime. Although committing a UDA is 
not the same as committing a crime, there a re  enough similarities (both 
a r e  hazardous  t o  o t h e r  members  of society and both a re  formally 
prohibited and dealt with by society) that  criminoloqical theories have 
some application. 
Within the area of criminology, theorists have devised explanations of 
why individuals commit crimes, and more importantly, how to control that  
behavior. Two theoretical trends in the sociology of crime are especially 
important to driving behavior: the interactionist school and the contro l  
school. These are discussed in order. 
Interactionist Theory 
The interactionists (e.g., Sutherland and Cressey 1974) maintain that all 
behavior, criminal and noncriminal, is learned by association with others 
in i n t i m a t e  groups  t h a t  sha r e  a t t i tudes  and beliefs favorable to a 
behavior. These interactions, therefore, occur primarily a t  the secondary 
level of social control. The interactionists suggest that the attitudes and 
beliefs held by the social environment condition individuals1 behavior; that  
is, if one associates with delinquents, then the probability of becoming a 
delinquent is increased. Jensen (1972), Voss (1964), and K obrin (19 51) have 
documented this hypothesis in their studies of delinquency. 
Interactionist theory has a l r e adv  been adap t ed  t o  explain such 
behaviors as white-collar crime and police occupational behavior. The 
theory identifies causal factors of behavior, including: learning about a 
behavior through communication with others in intimate personal qroups; 
learning the particular techniques of committing a behavior; learning the 
at t i tudes,  motives, drives, and rationalizations supporting a behavior; 
learning attitudes and behaviors on a priority basis according to varying 
scales of duration, frequency, and intensity of exposure; and learning 
behaviors by associating with groups supporting the behaviors. 
Applying this theory to traffic behavior does require a change i n  
content from crime to traffic violations. The translation can be arranged 
in the following manner, A person learns improper driving behavior 
through association with such intimate personal groups as a peer group. 
If this group supports traffic-violating behavior, then the person will learn 
the techniques of violation, and, more importantly, the attitudes, drives, 
motives, and rationalization that support this violating behavior. Finally, 
the incidence of the improper traffic behavior is based on the duration, 
frequency, and intensity of the association with the group supporting; some 
violation of traffic rules. 
However, as in the case of secondary group influences, it cannot be 
said with certainty that all the groups to  which a r isk- taker  or an 
incompetent  driver belongs wi l l  consist of similar drivers. Driving 
' \  
behavior normally will not have the same prominence in a person's life as 
more serious crime or delinquency. 
Control Theory 
A second sociological theory of behavior, Hirschifs control theory, has 
been adapted by Minor (1977) to describe traffic behavior. Hirschifs 
theory (1969) maintains that a person's behavior is controlled by bonds to 
conventional society. Specific elements of these bonds are: an objective 
attachment to conventional others; a rational commitment to conformity; 
a time-consuming involvement in conventional activities; and belief in the 
personal legitimacy of the law. Minor's adaptation changed Hirschits 
original model by replacing time-consuming involvement with fear. 
The control  model allows the  relative effect of each factor on 
improper driving behavior to be ascertained. Fear, for example, was 
found to  have such a small e f f e c t  on traffic behavior that 'Minor 
suggested it be eliminated from the model; in contrast, belief in the 
legitimacy of the law was found to have a relatively large effect on this 
behavior. Attachment was also found to affect compliance in traffic 
behavior. 
This model suggests in te res t ing  policy implications. If fear of 
apprehension plays a small role in controlling improper behavior, while a 
be l i e f  in t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  of t h e  law plays a substant ial  one, 
countermeasures should be directed toward increasing the individual's 
belief in the law rather than towards increasing fear of apprehension or 
fear of traffic crashes. Note that controls may differ, depending on the 
driving behavior in question. The driver who stops for a red light at a 
deserted intersection at midnight is more likely prompted by respect for 
the law than a truck driver who drives a t  reduced speed on heavily 
traveled expressways for fear of getting a ticket. 
LEGAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
As pointed out ea r l i e r ,  this study considered a wide range of 
risk-management strategies to reduce the incidence of UDAs. The 
possible areas of countermeasure activity include-but go well beyond--the 
formal systems and strategies used by society to deal with risky drivers. 
This section discusses one particular mechanism of social control: the 
formal act ions of the Criminal Justice System and the Traffic Law 
System to reduce the incidence of behavior that is formally prohibited. 
The actions of these formal systems are considered in the larger context 
of the social-control theories presented here. 
The previous section discussed a number of psychological and 
sociological concepts regarding the processes of socialization and social 
control. It was noted that individuals' behaviors can be controlled by 
systems of rewards and punishments. These systems operate on a number 
of levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The threat of formal legal 
punishment, administered on the  t e r t i a ry  level ,  has been labeled 
deterrence. 
The concept of de ter rence  re fers  to activities initiated by the 
government (an agent of tertiary level control) and directed a t  the 
reduction of improper activity by members of the society (Gibbs 1975). In 
the deterrence framework, individual behavior is hypothesized to stem 
from the risk they perceive of receiving negative sanctions for engaging 
in prohibited behavior. Andenaes (196 6) refined the concept of deterrence 
by noting that it is composed of two elements: the actual effect of 
sanction, and the symbolic effect of the threat of sanction. 
The actual effect is called special deterrence; it refers to the effect  
of sanctioning specific individuals to deter them from engaging again in a 
particular behavior. Special deterrence is used by practitioners in the 
area of traffic behavior, such as when a driver's license is revoked for 
continued prohibited driving actions. In effect,  the sanction deters the 
person from driving, from committing further UDAs, or both. 
The symbolic threat of sanction is referred to as general deterrence. 
I t  opera tes  by dissuading individuals--w hether punished or not--from 
committing a violation in the first place. Both general and special  
deterrence operate on the same principle-that is, the threat of negative 
sanctioning. A number of researchers (Gibbs 1975; Andenaes 1974; Zimring 
and Hawkins 1973) have investigated how the threat of sanctioning affects 
improper behaviors. Their findings are of interest to this discussion. 
General Deterrence: Theory 
Synthesizing Gibbs (1975), Andenaes (197 4),  and Cooper (1973), general 
deterrence refers toactivities with symbolic overtones initiated on the 
tertiary level of control that are  directed toward the elimination or 
curtailment of improper, criminal or unsafe actions by employing neqa t ive 
sanctions. The effectiveness of general deterrence is based on the power 
of the control symbol. This power consists of three subjective elements: 
ce r t a in ty ,  swiftness, and severity. This symbol's power is, in turn, 
directly affected by the individual's p e r c e p t i o n  of the  c e r t a i n t y ,  
swiftness, and severity of the symbol's power. 
Implicit in the above definition of general de te r rence  a r e  t h r e e  
assumptions. First, the definition assumes that the individual perceives 
that a control symbol and a threat of sanction exists. Second, it assumes 
that the individual is motivated by hedonistic drives that determine one's 
decisions to engage in improper behavior; according to  this notion, the 
individual will engage in behavior that is the most rewarding and avoid 
behavior t h a t  is t he  most cos t ly .  This  was d i s c u s s e d  in t h e  
decision-making materials in Chapter Two. Finally, the definition assumes 
that the control system has the capacity to  discover and sanction 
improper behavior. The efficacy of general deterrence rests on the 
validity of these assumptions. For discussions of the validity of these 
assumptions, see, for example, Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin (1980), and 
Wilson and McLaren (1972). 
The sanction factor itself is composed of three elements: certainty, 
swiftness, and severity. These are defined as the objective components 
of the deterrence doctrine. They refer to the actual capacity of the 
control system to deliver sanctions as well as to the content of the  
sanction itself. In all cases, the law is treated as a given and there is 
no discussion of its origin or objective legitimacy. Instead, the objective 
components consider the impact of how the law is administered. 
Certainty of eventual punishment is the first objective element to 
affect a sanction's deterrence potency. Police are aware of only 50% of 
the crimes committed and arrest individuals in  only 16% of those known 
crimes (U.S. President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence 1966). This is partially because of the limited number of police. 
The national average is 2.5 police officers per 1,000 population (U.S. 
Departments of Commerce and Justice 1979). We estimated in the final 
report of the police enforcement project that there are only about 100,000 
full-time-equivalent police officers performing all 4 of the functions of 
police traffic services (Joscelyn and Jones 1980). We also estimated that 
a t  least 10 times as many of f icers  would be needed to  provide a 
reasonable threat of apprehension for a speeding violation. Sheehe (1963) 
estimated that one in every 7,600 motorists could, on the average, expect 
to be ticketed for a speeding violation on a certain Michigan highway. 
Joscelyn and Jones (1972) conducted an attitudinal survey and found that 
individuals believe that their chances of being caught for a traffic 
violation are small, although their perceptions are higher than is actually 
the case. In short, the actual chance of apprehension is slight, thus 
reducing the effect of the sanction on driving behavior. 
Thus, the threat of the sanctioning first of all depends upon the 
certainty that a sanction will follow an improper behavior. In keeping 
with current  knowledge of human decision-making, the threat of 
sanctioning is diminished if an individual knows there is a low probability 
of a sanction following a behavior. In regard to traffic enforcement, an 
individual will speed if he or she wishes to reduce travel time and, a t  the 
same time, believes that receiving a ticket or having a crash is not likely. 
The second objective element that influences the deterrent effect of a 
sanction, the swiftness of the sanctioning process, involves the time 
period between committing an offense and receiving a sanction. This 
point is supported by other research as noted earlier in this section: the 
greater the time lapse between the behavior and the sanction, the less 
effective the threat of that sanction will be. In short, the deterrent 
effect of a traffic sanction is reduced if the sanctions are not received 
until long after the offense has been committed. While traffic sanctions 
are usually processed more quickly than are other criminal violations, 
there is still a time delay between the traffic violation and the sanction. 
This delay (in accord with the learning principles discussed in  a previous 
section of this chapter) is likely to reduce the deterrence capacity of a 
traffic sanction. These time delays are difficult to  eliminate in the 
present  sys tem,  for they s tem from cons t i tu t ional  and statutorv 
constraints on criminal-justice and traffic-law system activity, as well as 
a lack of police and judicial resources to process traffic cases more 
rapidly. 
The final objective sanctioning element is sanction severity. In 
general, increasing severity tends to increase the deterrent effect of a 
sanction. However, because determination of sanction severity is a 
value-laden process, there is much disagreement as to  its effect on the 
objective power of the sanctioning process. What is more, penalties for 
traffic violations are fixed by political bodies such as legislatures and are 
applied by judges; thus, public opinion regarding the severity of these 
offenses must be considered. Ross (1960) asserts that the driving public 
views most improper driving as a folk crime that has l i t t le public 
condemnation attached to it, Lacking the force of public condemnation, 
most sanctions for traffic violations carry negligible power. Their main 
power is found in the financial inconvenience they create (Joscelyn 197 5 ) .  
Much operant conditioning research supports the contention that with 
increasing sanction severity, the threat of the sanction (and subsequent 
deterrent effect) also increases. However, the results are not clearcut. 
Beccaria (1963) and Tittle and Rowe (1974) have noted a T7U-shapedu 
relationship between severity of sanction and the incidence of the 
targeted behavior. When a sanction is not severe enough, it has no 
effect on an individual, and there is no threat. In other words, there 
appears to be a lower threshold limit. Likewise, there is a lessening of a 
deterrent effect a t  very high severity levels; Bankston and Cramer (1974) 
report that as severity increases, a "saturation point" is reached and the 
deterrent effect diminishes. 
In summary, the power of the existing sanction elements to deter most 
traffic violations is low. First, the chances of punishment are reduced by 
limits on control agency resources. Second, the severitv of the sanction 
is minor and no public condemnation or stigma follows conviction of most 
violations. Finally, the negative effects of sanctions are reduced by the 
amount of time by which the sanction follows the act.  All in all, the 
objective power of the sanction is often minimal and is seen by the 
public more as an inconvenience than a serious threat (Joscelyn 1975). 
Severity, swiftness, and certainty of sanctions interact to affect the 
perception of threat. For example, if both the sever i ty  and the  
swiftness of sanctions were very high, but certainty of detection were 
low, the overall threat would be minimal. In contrast, i f  certainty were 
high, but severity and swiftness were low, the overall threat nonetheless 
would be likely t o  de te r  the  behavior of concern. In any event  
consideration must be given to each of the three elements and to their 
interactions. 
One other point deserves mention. Since the focus of this report is 
on general risk-management strategies, emphasis is placed on general 
deterrence, which is one such strategy. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that general and special deterrence cannot, in operational settings, be 
separated.  Punishment of enough individuals must occur for anv 
general-deterrent threat to be credible; conversely, any special-deterrence 
activity is likely to have at least some general deterrent effect. 
The preceding definition of and assumptions about deterrence have 
been combined by Gibbs (1975) into a doctrine of general deterrence. 
Gibbst doctrine s tates  that the relationship between the sanction and the 
resulting behavior is mediated by two intervening factors: individual 
percept ion and the d e t e r r e n t  e f f e c t  of the sanction. Pictorially, the 
doctrine can be described: 
+ + + 
Sanction -+ - Perception -Deterrence -+ Behavior 
Perception of the certainty and severity of a sanction is the first 
intervening factor that, according to Gibbs, determines the effectiveness 
of sanctions on behavior. It can either enhance or minimize the power of 
a sanction: When drivers overestimate the power of control agencies to 
deliver sanctions, the deterrent effect increases; when they underestimate 
the power, the deterrent effect is reduced. Three elements are involved 
in this process of perception: the public perception of the legitimacy of 
the rule; the perception of the possibility of apprehension and sanctioning; 
and the value of the sanction to the individual. These elements make up 
the subjec t ive  power of the sanction (Erickson and Gibbs 1978; Gibbs 
1975). 
Public perception of the legi t imacy of a rule, in part, determines 
individuals1 compliance. The greater the public perception that a law is 
legitimate, the greater is their compliance with that law. Compliance 
with the 55 mph National Maximum Speed Limit (NMSL) is an a~propr i a t e  
example. The original purpose of the NMSL was to conserve fuel. Data 
show that compliance was g rea te r  in 1973-7 5 ,  when drivers  faced 
widespread fuel shortages, than in later years when fuel was generallv 
available (Claybrook 197 8). 
Individual p e r c e p t i o n  of t h e  probabili ty of apprehension and 
sanctioning is a second subjective element that affects the power of a 
sanction (Buikhuisen 197 2). This perceptual element can be divided into 
two concerns. The first concern refers to  simple awareness of the  
proscribed behavior on the part of the driver, that is, whether the driver 
was aware that a certain driving behavior violated the law. While drivers 
are  generally aware of most traffic laws, there are some rules of the 
road (such as basic speed laws requiring speeds to be appropriate for 
conditions, and rules concerning amber lights a t  intersections) that may 
produce confusion on the part of drivers. In other cases, drivers may not 
see or understand traffic signs. In addition, there are times when a 
driver inadvertently commits a driving act that he or she otherwise knows 
is wrong, for example, by following the pace s e t  by other  t r a f f i c  
exceeding the speed limit. The second concern relating to perceived 
probability of receiving a sanction involves drivers' perceptions of the 
probability of being apprehended should they consciously engage in illegal 
driving behavior. This determination is based on such factors as, the 
perceived probability of a police officer being present; the perceived 
probability that any officers who are present will take enforcement  
action; and the perceived probability of being sanctioned bv a traffic 
court (see, Bailey and Lott 1976). These estimations of apprehension and 
sanctioning are based on the driver's past experience, the actions of other 
drivers, the driver's desire to avoid a sanction, and the personal gains 
received by violating the traffic rule (such as speeding and saving time, 
or following too closely and relieving frustration). 
The final element of the perception factor deals with the meaning or 
the value a s p e c i f i c  a c t  has for a dr iver .  Determination of value 
involves the decision processes described in Chapter Two, In formal 
decision-theoretic models, the value of an act is assessed by calculating 
its net, that is, the net desirability of the consequences of the behavior. 
Using this calculus, if the net gain is positive, the individual will violate 
the law; on the other hand, if the net gain is negative (that is, a loss), 
the driver will avoid the act. For example, drivers will speed to reduce 
travel time (a gain) if they perceive their chances of being caught (a 
loss) as minimal. The value or meaning of the  a c t ,  then, is t he  
determinat ion of the  net gain based on the perceived rewards and 
punishments of the  behavior. Note, however, t ha t  the  value of 
committing a particular act is not the only factor that determines 
whether the driver will commit it. For example, a driver who is alreadv 
law-abiding might avoid committing a U D A  even after determining that 
the UDA would produce a net gain. 
The second intervening factor in Gibbsl deterrence doctrine is the 
deterrent effect  of the sanction. Deterrent effect is a combination of 
the objective elements of the sanction and their subjective perception by 
the  individual. If a rule  is considered l eg i t ima te ,  t he  r a t e  of 
apprehension high, and the rewards for violation minimal, the effect will 
be great and the individual will be deterred. Other combinations of these 
elements could reduce the deterrent effect of the sanction and thereby 
increase the incidence of risky behavior. 
Empirical Research on General Deterrence: Objective Measures 
Gibbsl general deterrence doctrine contains four major components: 
the sanction itself; individual perception; deterrent effect; and resulting; 
behavior. It is therefore important to consider both the objective power 
of the sanction and its subjective power to produce a deterrent effect. 
Deterrence theory has been tested experimentally, and these experiments 
have been reported in the empirical literature dealing with the influence 
of objective measures of sanctions and the influence of perceived power 
of sanctions on compliance behavior. 
Nagin (1978), who thoroughly reviewed the  general  deterrence 
l i t e r a t u r e ,  a s se r t s  t h a t  de te r rence  is " inherent ly an a g g r e g a t e  
phenomenon," that is, its effects are  reflected in the behaviors of an 
entire population. Nagin goes on to note that all analyses therefore use 
aggregate data on crime-commission rates with various sanction measures. 
The effects of general deterrence can be t e s t e d  by observing t h e  
relat ionships bet  ween cr ime rates and the certaintv or severity of 
sanctions for that crime. Three sanction measures in particular have 
been studied in the area of general deterrence. These are: probability 
of apprehension; probability of imprisonment; and severity of punishment. 
Probabi l i ty  of apprehension has been measured in operational terms 
in two ways. The first is by ttclearance rates," that is, the proportion of 
reported crimes that are solved. The second operational definition of 
probability of apprehension is the ratio of arrests to reported offenses. 
P r o b a b i l i t y  of i m p r i s o n m e n t  is measured by the ratio of prison 
commitments to reported crimes. Severity of punishment is defined as 
I 
the mean or median time served by those imprisoned. Findings in each 
of these areas are discussed in turn. 
Investigators have generally reported inverse associations between 
crime rates and the probability of apprehension. Likewise, inverse 
relationships have generally been reported between several crime 
categories and the probability of imprisonment. 
As Nagin notes, however, the relationship between crime rates and 
severity of punishment is somewhat equivocal. Negative associations 
have been reported for homicide rates and for each offense classification 
within the index (serious) crimes category in only four studies: Ehrlich 
(1973); Bean and Cushing (1971); Gray and Martin (1969); and Gibbs (1968). 
Several investigators have found a negative association between severity 
of punishment and homicide rate, but no relationship between sanction 
severity and the rest of the serious crimes (Antunes and Hunt [I9731 ; 
Logan [1972, 19711 ; Chiricos and Waldo El9701 ; and Little [I9691 1. 
Other investigators (e.g., Forst [I9761 ; Avio and Clarke [I9741 ; Sjoquist 
[19733; and Vandaele [19731) reported no significant association between 
severity of punishment and several crime categories. Moreover, Avio and 
Clarke (1974) found a positive association with robbery and with theft for 
the severity of punishment measure. 
Another. measure of general deterrence is that of police expenditure 
per capita. As Nagin (1978) notes this measure reflects the intensity of 
police presence with g rea te r  police presence hypothesized to be a 
deterrent to criminal activity. Relatively few studies have been done in 
this a rea ;  moreover, the resul ts  of these s tudies  a r e  equivocal. 
McPheters and Stronge (1974) and Swimmer (1974) report  a negat ive 
association with "crimev for police expenditures, while Greenwoo6 and 
Wadycki (1973) report a positive association. In neither case are the 
crime categories defined or described. 
A1 t hough studies that focused on objective measures of the sanctioning 
process have not been concerned with traffic or driving behaviors but 
with more serious criminal activities, the research suggests that increased 
probabilities of apprehension or punishment can effectively deter illeqal 
behaviors. However, the relationship between severity of punishment and 
cr ime r a t e s  is not a s  c l ea rcu t ,  and results are equivocal a t  best. 
Likewise, no clearcut relationship has yet emerged between intensity of 
police presence and rates of crime. 
Empirical Research on General Deterrence: Subjective Measures 
The empirical research cited above has been concerned with t h e  
so-called objective measures of general deterrence (i.e., probability of 
apprehension, probability of imprisonment, and severity of punishment). 
Another group of studies in this area of deterrence deal with individuals1 
perceptions of punishment and deterrence. As Bailey and Lott (1976) 
note: fl .  . . de te r rence  theory suggests that it is onefs subjective 
perceptions of punishment t h a t  a r e  i mportant ,  not the  objec t ive  
probability of apprehension and the actual sanctions that resultu (p. 99). 
Perception studies have focused upon two populations: individuals 
classified as criminal or delinquent; and individuals not classified that 
way. Gibbs (1975) summarizes the underlying deterrence theory arguments 
for studying the perceptions of these two groups: 
If individuals commit crimes because they have not been 
deterred and if individuals refrain from crimes because they 
have been deterred, then those who commit crimes tend to 
perceive punishment as less certain and/or less severe than do 
those who conform t o  laws. Another way t o  put the  
argument is that criminals tend to underestimate both the 
object ive ce r t a in ty  of punishment and t h e  magn i tude  
(presumptive severity) of statutory penalties (e.g., length of 
imprisonment), while normals tend t o  overes t imate  both 
properties of punishment (p. 209). 
Results of studies investigating the relationship between participation 
in criminal activities and perception of sanctions are far from consistent. 
Waldo and Chiricos (1972) studied the relat ionship between ce r t a in  
self-reported criminal activities and perceptions of both severity of 
punishment and likelihood of being caught; they found a significant inverse 
association with the perceived likelihood of punishment for participation 
in both marijuana use and petty theft. However, the correlations between 
these two activities and the perceived severity of punishment were small, 
Bailey and Lott (1976) also obtained measures of perceived probability 
of apprehension and the severity of sanctions for a number of criminal 
behaviors. In addition, they obtained data on self -reported i l legal 
ac t iv i ty .  Their resul ts  indicated that each behavior was generally 
unrelated to either perception of apprehension or perception of sanction 
severity. Claster (cited in Bailey and Lott 1976) obtained similar results, 
finding no difference between delinquents and nondelinquents in their 
perceptions of the risk of arrest and conviction. Gibbs (1975) concludes 
that 17contrasts between the two populations are not appreciable, and 
t h e r e  is no conv inc ing  evidence tha t  criminals or delinquents 
underestimate the objective certainty of punishmentv (p. 209). 
These above perception studies,  however, a re  subject to basic 
methodological flaws. First, as Gibbs (1975) points out, in most studies, 
individuals identified as criminal or delinquent had been apprehended and 
convicted at the time of the study; it is possible that their perceptions 
were altered by the actual experience of punishment and thus did not 
reflect their perceptions prior to committing the cr ime.  A be t t e r  
strategy would have been to assess the association between perce~tions 
and the subsequent criminal or deliquent acts of the individuals within a 
given population. A second problem in this area of research is the 
exclusion of extralegal (e.g., socioeconomic, demographic, and regional) 
variables from data analyses. This holds true for both objective and 
perceptual measures of deterrence studies. Both Gibbs (1975) and Naqin 
(1978) note the important role that such factors play in generating or 
inhibiting crime. 
One more issue warrants attention in the study of the effects of 
general deterrence (actual or perceived) upon crime rates or criminal 
activity: the nature of the offense or activity being investigated. Most 
studies focus on the 'lseriouslt crimes: Studies of traffic offenses are few, 
despite the fact that violations of traffic laws are the most common 
form of law violations in the United States (Ross 1960). However, Gibbs' 
survey of traffic studies (1975) indicates that the findings of existing 
traffic studies do tend to support the deterrence doctrine. Moreover, 
some kinds of traffic offenses are much more deterrable than others; 
specifically, parking violations were found more deterrable than moving 
violations. Nonetheless, Gibbs criticizes the traffic studies in this area: 
. . . the defect of traffic studies is that they are often li t t le 
more than casual observations about change in the number of 
officially reported traffic violations a f t e r  a change in 
prescribed punishment or enforcement procedures (usually the 
latter). Even if such observations can be taken as studies, 
they are not fully reported, and they are rarely published in 
professional journals, which would ensure scrutinv by a critical 
and informed audience. (p. 210) 
In sum, the empirical studies have yielded conflicting results regarding 
the effect of perceived probability and sever i ty  of punishment on 
subsequent behavior. Certain methodological flaws possibly contribute to 
the discrepancy in results; in addition, deterrence studies dealing with 
crime might not be fully applicable to traffic offenses. 
SUMMARY 
The design and development of adequate countermeasures to unsafe 
driving acts requires an understanding of how socially accept able behavior 
can be effectively developed, altered, and maintained, This is the process 
of social control. In this chapter the fundamental principles of social 
control were described. Major theories and issues were identified and 
related to driver behavior; examples of how these principles have been 
applied in highway safety were noted where appropriate. 
The literature reviewed was drawn primarily from the disciplines of 
psychology and sociology, As such, i t  included materials dealing with 
behavior on both the individual and the social level. 
Three levels of social control have been identified and labeled by 
theorists: primary (family); secondary (voluntarily chosen groups); and 
tertiary (formal mechanisms established by society). 
Two major psychological approaches relevant to the social control 
process for drivers were discussed: learning principles and developmental 
principles. The former emphasize manipulating certain environmental or 
social conditions to change a particular driving behavior. The procedure 
or strategy used to effect a behavior change depends upon the specific 
learning paradigm used. The developmental approach to social control 
stresses an individual's adaptation to experience and suggests educational 
strategies that take account of driver experience. 
Sociological approaches 'include altering informal group and societal 
attitudes and values toward driving and beliefs regarding legitimacy of 
authority. Two theories of group influence on behavior were discussed: 
the interactionist theory and control theory. The former theorv states 
that behavior is learned by associating with groups whose attitudes favor 
certain behaviors, while the l a t t e r  theory s t a t e s  tha t  behavior is 
determined by an individual's bonds to conventional society. 
Deterrence refers to activities initiated by the government (an agent 
of the tertiary social control level) and directed toward the curtailment 
of certain activities by the members of its society. Deterrence can 
dissuade individuals from committing a violation in the first place (general 
deterrence) or from committing further offenses (special deterrence). 
Because general deterrence is more pertinent to general risk-management 
strategies, it was the primary focus of this section. 
Both the  objective and subjective components of the sanctioning 
process were discussed in relation to their deterrent effect on behavior. 
Empirical research indicates that increased certainty of apprehension or 
sanctioning can increase the deterrent effect on certain illegal activities. 
Studies of the relationship among severity of punishment, intensity of 
police presence, and individualsf perceptions of the sanctioning process 
have yielded conflicting results; no clearcut relationship has emerqed to 
date. Among the possible factors playing a role in  these discrepant 
findings are: the study of the perceptions of persons already identified as 
criminal; the exclusion of extralegal variables from data analyses, and the 
nature of the offense being investigated. 

CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The literature on decision-making and social control reveals several 
key principles tha t  can be useful i n  designing human-or i en ted  
countermeasures for reducing the incidence of unsafe driving actions that 
are conscious and intentional. These principles and their implications for 
this project are discussed in this section. 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PRINCIPLES 
Some--but not all-UDAs are the result of driver decision-making that 
involves (a) consciously weighing the llplusesl' and llminusesl' or t he  
outcomes of certain courses of action; and (b) choosing the course of 
action that is likely to produce the largest net plus (or the smallest net 
minus). Other UDAs result from l'decision-makingtl that is rationally 
defective in that it ignores the probabilities, the values, or the outcomes 
that would result from a particular course of action. Still other UDAs 
occur in the absence of a conscious decision: Some are the product of 
inadvertent or unconscious behavior (such as speeding because the driver 
follows other vehicles ahead that are also speeding); others result from 
following an internalized "scriptu (such as speeding because Burt Reynolds 
does so in the movies, without regard to whether the speeding "pays off1' 
in time saving or whether it is unsafe). 
Even when drivers choose UDA or non-UDA behavior using a conscious 
decision-making process, each driver is likely to set  up the decision 
problem in a different way. Each individual will assign a different plus 
or minus value to  each outcome, and each will assign different 
probabilitites to the various outcomes. This is so because each individual 
solves decision problems in  the context of his or her own llworld-model.l' 
World-models differ from driver to driver, and are based on such factors 
as one's preexisting att i tutes and beliefs, the influences of others, the 
way in which one perceives the various possible outcomes, the information 
available for decision-making, and the biasing or reinforcing effects of 
prior, similar experiences. In addition, human beings are not skilled in 
understanding or applying the concept of probability, especially, as in the 
case of t ra f f ic  crashes, when the chances of having an accident on a 
particular trip are extremely small. 
Two majo r  a p p r o a c h e s  t h a t  can be used t o  change driver 's  
decision-making processes with respect to  committing a U D A  have been 
identified. The first of these, called the "external incentivesyt approach, 
attempts to  rearrange the inputs that a driver considers in making a 
decision, but leaves  t h e  world-model intact. The second approach 
attempts to change the driver's world-model itself by changing t h e  
attitudes and values that help make it up. 
The literature indicates that social control is relevant to the U D A  
problem in two major respects. First, social control forces produce 
external incent ives ,  especial ly  t h e  t h r e a t  of punishment,  t h a t  a 
decision-maker will take into account in weiqhing the pluses and the 
minuses of committing a UDA,  Second, social control forces influence 
the values, attitudes, and beliefs that help make up driverst world-models. 
Changes in world-models can result in changes in driving behavior. 
Some psychological theories of behavior state that human behavior can 
be conditioned: External stimuli presented to a driver will cause that  
driver to perform one behavior over another. For example, a prohibited 
behavior can be eliminated or reduced by following it with an appropriate 
stimulus: administering punishment or removing a reward, One weakness 
of conditioned-behavior techniques is that some conditioning must occur 
on some regular basis to maintain the desired response, for example, the 
absence of bad driving behavior. Other psychological theories maintain 
t h a t  behavior changes also arise from within the individual as the 
individual matures by adapting to experiences, learning to interpret laws 
regulating behavior, and eventually acquiring a sense of responsibility that 
leads to law-abiding behavior. 
One sociological theory,  borrowed from s tudies  of c r ime and 
delinquency, stresses that an individual learns correct and incorrec t  
behaviors through interactions with other group members. Through these 
peer groups one also develops attitudes toward those behaviors. Another 
theory, also taken from sociological studies of crime, states that a person 
is more likely to engage in correct behavior if (s)he has strong bonds to 
conventional society: One controlled by those bonds is more likely to 
obey the law out of a perception that the law is legitimate than out of a 
fear of being caught and punished for violating it. 
Social control can be exerted a t  any of three levels; the agent of 
each level of control varies. The primary level of social control occurs 
primarily within the family and is exercised by parents  or the i r  
equivalents. Secondary level control is exercised within the peer group. 
Tertiary level controls are exercised by formally established and socially 
powerful entities. 
A special case of social control exercised at the tertiary level is legal 
deterrence. It is administered through the criminal-justice system and its 
subsystems (including the traffic-law system). Its goal is to reduce the 
incidence of prohibited behaviors by threatening law violators with 
punishment. Deterrence directed a t  the individual violator and intended 
to discourage that person from committing future violations is known as 
special deterrence. Deterrence directed at the entire population, whether 
violators or not, is called general deterrence. General deterrence is 
society's best known strategy for general risk management. It is related 
to special deterrence in that a certain amount of the latter is necessary 
to maintain a credible deterrent threat toward other would-be violators. 
The power of a deterrent threat depends first of all on its objective 
aspects :  What is the cer ta in ty  tha t  punishment will follow the 
commission of a violation? How swiftly will punishment follow i t s  
commission? How severe will that punishment be? In addition to these 
objective factors of certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment, the 
power of a deterrent threat also is determined by how an individual 
perceives that threat. When a person perceives a high probability of 
being detected and punished for violating a law, considers the punishment 
especially unpleasant, or has a high regard for the legitimacy of that law, 
the deterrent effect is comparatively greater and is more likely to result 
in socially acceptable behavior. 
In its application to prohibited behavior, including traffic violations, 
general deterrence has several weaknesses. The criminal justice and the 
t raff ic  law systems are not omnipotent and cannot possibly apprehend 
every violator. Not all traffic violators consciously weigh the advantages 
and disadvantages of violating the law, Some traffic laws are not widely 
respected as legitimate, and others are not well understood by or not 
even known to the driver. Nonetheless, it is clear that the threat of 
punishment does discourage individuals from violating t h e  l aw.  
Unfortunately, we do not yet know how much of what threat is required 
for given groups of individuals under given conditions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERMEASURES 
The use of different kinds of decision-making structures by drivers 
implies that no single countermeasure approach can be used to promote 
compliant behavior among all drivers. People who follow scripts may 
need to be approached differently than the integrators and synthesizers. 
The former group will need credible models of behavior to follow, while 
the lat ter  require plausible information about the possible outcomes of a 
decision to commit or to not commit a UDA. 
Drivers also differ with respect to memory and perception. Their 
objectivity depends upon both prior information, as well as their physical 
and emotional state. Their "utility functionstt differ widely: a driver who 
attaches the greatest importance to the use of a car for transportation 
would be expected to  make a different assessment of the utilities 
associated with a given UDA in a given situation than would a driver who 
attaches the greatest importance to recreational use of a car. 
Thus, countermeasures may be expected to be more effective when 
they are focused at specific target groups with specific decision problems. 
Such countermeasures should then be applied a t  times when the group is 
most susceptible to them. 
The time dimension will be, in fact ,  an important consideration in 
countermeasure design, Research shows that the amount of learning 
produced by a response to a behavior is a decreasing function of the time 
delay between the response and the behavior. Further, decision-makers 
tend to tfdiscountv the future and place more emphasis on the immediate 
consequences of a decision. Such lTrecencyll phenomena indicate that 
countermeasures should focus more on the immediate consequences of a 
U D A  or non-UDA decision and that rewards and punishments should be 
applied as soon as possible after a target event. 
Research into the decision-making processes of humans clearly shows 
that people are not good a t  assessing probabilities, particularly small 
probabilities, and that past events or experience affect the assessment of 
probabilities. This suggests that countermeasures aimed a t  influencing 
decision-making should focus on the possible consequences of a decision 
rather than the probabilities associated with those consequences. When 
probabilities are addressed, they should be related to the experiences of 
the target group. 
Finally, both the "external incentives" appproach and the "attitude 
changeTf approach should be used in countermeasures aimed a t  influencing 
driver decisions about UDAs. An example of the former approach is 
providing information to a driver that driving 7 0  mph instead of 5 5  mph 
on a twenty-five-mile commuting trip to work saves less than six minutes 
of commuting time. The latter approach might portray speeding as 
foolish rather than lfmachon behavior. 
The literature on social control indicates that the learning theories of 
psychology have many applications to human-oriented countermeasures 
against UDAs. Optimal use of well-known techniques for conditioning 
behavior has seldom been attempted in highway safety.  When such 
techniques have been demonstrated (Brackett and Edwards 1977) they have 
not been widely adopted. Other applications should be investigated. 
Research has demonstrated that socialization can be achieved through 
one's association with others. Again, this familiar principle has not been 
widely applied in  highway safety. Countermeasures should attempt to use 
the more informal influences of groups (i.e., the secondary level of social 
control) rather than relying completely on tertiary-level approaches such 
as are embodied in legal-system strategies. 
Legal-system strategies rely on the principle of legal deterrence to 
realize their effects. This requires the establishment of credible and 
legitimate deterrent threats. Such threats cannot be established merely 
b y  passing a law proscribing unsafe driving behavior. Legal-system 
countermeasures require a relatively high likelihood that a prohibited 
behavior will quickly be followed by a punishment perceived to be 
sufficiently severe (but not too severe) by a driver. 
The difficulty of accomplishing all of this within the constraints 
imposed through existing modes of operation of the traffic law system is 
enormous. New modes of operat ion tha t  are not limited by such 
constraints as direct contact of law violators by a police officer should 
be sought in future legal-system countermeasures against UDAs. 
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